http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sun-tzu.jpg
Translation by Patrick Edwin Moran
孫子兵法》
Master Sun's Art of War
孫武
Sun Wu (544 - 496)
Chapter One
始計 第一篇 (Beginning) Plotting the Course Chapter One
孫子曰﹕
Master Sun said:
兵者，國之大事，死生之地，存亡之道，不可不察也。
Warfare is a major affair of the state, the locus of life and death,
the path between existence and destruction, and one cannot fail to
make oneself aware of these facts.
{{PEM: Master Sun is writing for the ruler, but in a democracy he
would be writing for all those involved in the decision process.}}
故經之以五事，
Truly, one ought to organize analysis of warfare according to five
constant elements.
校之以計，
It should be worked out in practice on the basis of tactical plans,
而索其情﹕
and each action ought to be objectively evaluated by looking at the
real conditions and results.
一曰道，二曰天，三曰地，四曰將，五曰法。
The first constant element is one's Way*. The second constant factor
is the phenomena seen in the sky. The third constant factor is
geography and terrain. The fourth constant factor is military
leadership. The fifth constant factor is the military code of law.
*In America we might somewhat trivialize this as a "mission statement."
== [ Five constant elements clarified ]==
道者，令民與上同意，可與之死，可與之生，而民不畏危也。
The Way: If one leads the ordinary citizens and their superiors to
have consistency in intent, then even though the population be
faced with life and death crises, nevertheless the people will not
quail before dangers (the need for sacrifice).
{{PEM: What would the modern or Western term for "Way" be? What
brings the many elements of our society together and gives it a
common purpose?}}
天者，陰陽﹑寒暑﹑時制也。
The factors seen in the sky include those of [yearly or daily]
cyclical waxing and waning, cold weather and hot, and the
regulating factors imposed by the seasons:
地者，遠近﹑險易﹑廣狹﹑死生也。
Geology and terrain means factors of distance and propinquity,
hazardous travel and smooth going, wide concourses and narrow
constrictions, and deadly and life-giving lands (circumstances).
將者，智﹑信﹑仁﹑勇﹑嚴也。
Generalship involves wisdom, trust, benevolence, bravery, and
sternness.
法者，曲制﹑官道﹑主用也。
The military code of laws pertains to organizational forms, levels
of authority, expenses for maintenance, etc.
{{PEM: This list need not be considered complete. The general
intent seems to be to make reference to all pertinent matters that
could come under laws, rules and regulations.}}
凡此五者，將莫不聞，知之者勝，不知[之]者不勝。
The military leadership must not fail to inform itself fully of all of
the above five factors. If they are understood there can be
victory, and if they are not understood there will be no victory.
{{PEM: Master Sun could do a better job of explaining that lacking
a single factor can ruin a process, but merely possessing one of
several needed factors cannot provide success.}}
==[ Evaluation before any war occurs ]==
故校之以計，而索其情。
Truly, assessments on the basis of the five listed factors should be
worked out in advance on the basis of careful tactical plotting,
and their consequences as seen in real experiences are to be sought
out.
曰﹕主孰有道﹖將孰有能﹖天地孰得﹖法令孰行﹖兵眾孰強﹖士卒孰練﹖
賞罰孰明﹖
[Master Sun] said: Among the lords, who has a Way? Among the
military leadership, who actually possesses competency? As for the
factors seen in the sky (time, meteorological factors, etc.)
and the terrain and geographical factors,
who gains possession of the advantages they can provide? As for
military law and orders, who carries them out well? As for soldiers
and the support personnel, which army is the stronger? Among knights
and foot soldiers, which army is better trained? As for rewards
and punishments, which general is wiser in their use?
吾以此知勝負矣。
By these considerations I can tell who will win and who will lose.
將聽吾計，用之必勝，留之﹔
Should military leaders obey my tactical plans, then by using them
one must win. Keep them.
將不聽吾計，用之必敗，去之。
Should military leaders not adhere to my tactical plans, then by
using them one must lose. Get rid of them.
計利<而>[以]聽，乃為之勢，以佐其外。 <?>
When a tactical evaluation is beneficial and is obeyed, that informs
one's power configuration and can be used to assist one from the outside
[the factors of direct confrontation. (Examples of these "externals"
would be intelligence and alliances)].
勢者，因利而制權也
Power configurations are constituted by depending on contingent beneficial
factors to tip the balance of power.
{{PEM: Note that the same connection between 勢 shì and
利 lì is seen in the Dao De Jing where it is clear that the character
lì should indeed have the earth radical given it in
the earliest writings. The word 利 lì has three
components of meaning. One is the idea of the
sharpness of a sickle (shown in the right half of the
ordinary Chinese character, dāo 刂, a picture of a
knife).) The second is the benefit to humans derived
by harvesting grain (shown in the left part of the
character, hé 禾). The third component is not seen in
Chinese characters as they are currently written. That
component is tǔ 土, the earth that supplies the matrix
of factors necessary for the supply of water,
nutrients, etc. needed by the plant that produces the
grain. At the most abstract level shì is force and lì
is solid stuff that the power is directed through or
around. To give an example, consider a simple jet
engine made by a cylinder filled with compressed gas.
If the cylinder were to disappear or be shattered, the
compressed gas would expand in all directions and not
provide a useful effect. But if the cylinder is given
a planned orifice in one end, then when that orifice
is opened the cylinder will move. The energy in
the compressed gas is one component, and the metal in
the cylinder is the other component. Together they
form the shì that we call a jet engine. }}
==[Technologies of deception]==
兵者，詭道也。
Warfare is a way that uses deception (stratagems,
misdirection,
sleight of hand, etc.).
故能而示之不能，用而示之不用，近而示之遠，遠而示之近。
So when one is able, one must evince inability. When one intends to
utilize something, one must indicate to others that it is not intended to
be utilized. When one is [going somewhere nearby, one must make oneself appear to be
[going somewhere distant, and, when one is [going] far away, one must create the
impression that one is [going somewhere] nearby.
利而誘之，
Benefit and thereby seduce them
亂而取之，
Disorder and thereby take them.
實而備之，
Fill them up and thereby complete them.
{{PEM:In so doing one takes their edge off.}}
//or// If they have substantial forces, then make preparations against them.
強而避之，
Strengthen and thereby avoid them. //or//If they are strong then avoid them.
怒而撓之，
Anger and thereby incite them. //屈擾？//
卑而驕之，
Chasten and thereby make them [act] arrogant.
佚而勞之，
Make them indolent and thereby make work for them.//or is it that we nettle them?//
親而離之，
Get them close to you and thereby get away from them. //Or, If they cooperate in an amicable way, I have to split them up.//
{{PEM: On the surface, this idea sounds rather silly.
But Master Sun may have in mind a situation in which
one's army is being pursued by a stronger force. His
idea may be to maintain a group of crack troops with
chariots that moves forward on foot at the minimum
speed, keeping the chariots well enough forward not to
be observed, impeding the enemy force as much as
possible, perhaps occasionally leading the enemy into
ambushes, all with the intent of letting the slower
infantry and supply divisions get well ahead (perhaps
even taking a well-disguised side path). When the
front units have escaped, the rear units can then
mount their chariots and speed off to an assigned
regrouping place.}}
攻其不備，出其不意。
Attack where they are not prepared, and emerge from where
they do not expect you to be.
此兵家之勝，不可先傳也。
These are the sources of victory for the military strategists,
and one
cannot telegraph them beforehand.
{{PEM: Some of the manipulations mentioned above are easy to
understand. In the case of others it is more difficult to imagine
what Master Sun was trying to get at. That may actually be an
advantage to readers because it encourages them to think of ways
that enemies could be manipulated to do anything needful in one's
own defense.}}
PEM: Wei Ru-lin's book has a chart that, to me, does not support his own interpretation. See his page 78f. When the enemy is XXX the you YYY is always the format on the chart, but he says "When we have been chastened, or appear to be, then we make the enemy arrogant." I think that part is wrong. If I do something to make a person lacking in han yang look bad, then he will need to get back his prestige, his "face," and he will be more likely to make a brash decision to assault somewhere just to show how tough he is.
==[figuring]==
夫未戰而廟算勝者，得算多也﹔
Those who plan their victories (i.e., make winning
plans by devoting ample time to planning) in the
halls of the ancestors before going to war will
more often achieve their objectives.
未戰而廟算不勝者，得算少也。
Those who plan their defeats (i.e., make losing plans
by failing to use ample time for planning) in the
halls of power before going to war will less often
achieve their objectives.
多算勝，少算不勝，而況無算乎﹗
Those who make ample calculations win. Those who make
scant calculations do not win. So what, then, is to be
expected in the case of those who fail to make any
calculations whatsoever?
吾以此觀之，勝負見矣。
I look at things in these terms. By them one can see
who will get victory and who will experience defeat.
<2>《孫子兵法》 作戰篇第二
Chapter Two.
Going to War
孫子曰﹕
Master Sun said:
凡用兵之<道>[法]，馳車千駟，革車千乘，帶甲十萬，千里饋糧；
In all cases the method for using military force includes
providing for a thousand rapid attack chariots, a
thousand sets of light armored vehicles, one hundred
thousand armored soldiers, and maintaining a supply
line of a thousand li.
==[Breakdown]==
則內外之費，賓客之用，膠漆之材，車甲之奉，日費千金，
然後十萬之師舉矣。
Thus involved in quartermaster services in the front lines
and in the supply lines for an
army of 100,000 there are internal
and external expenses, the use of expensive consultants
(diplomatic and intelligence specialists),the materials used for maintenance of
equipment, the provision and maintenance of vehicles and armor, and
so one will experience daily expenses of several
thousands of pieces of gold as a condition for fielding an army of 100,000.
==[Consequences/Costs in other terms]==
其用戰也，貴勝，久則鈍兵挫銳，
When engaging in warfare, make victory the highest priority. If warfare
goes on for a long time the troops will lose their edge.
攻城則力屈.
If city walls are besieged, then one's energies will
be entangled.
久暴師則國用不足。
If one exposes one's army to danger for a long period
of time, then the resources of the nation will
eventually fall short.
夫鈍兵挫銳，
Now when one allows one's troops to lose their edge,
屈力殫貨，
when one's energies are entangled and one's stocks are
exhausted,
則諸侯乘其弊而起，
then the lords [with their regional militias] will
arise by taking advantage of one's lowered readiness,
雖有智者，
and even though one may obtain wise counsel,
不能善其後矣。
there is no way of getting a good result in the end.
故兵聞拙速，未睹巧之久也。
Truly, I have heard of cases of armies suffering due
to their inelegant haste, but not of long enduring
serendipity.
{{PEM: Things eventually go wrong.}}
夫兵久而國利者，未之有也。
Now never have nations been benefited when warfare
goes on for a long time.
故不盡知用兵之害者，則不能盡知用兵之利也。
So those who fail to completely take cognizance of the
liabilities of using warfare, may [in the
end] miss out on the benefits of using warfare.
PEM: Wei's bai-hua translation has a good observation at
this point that is worked into his translation. His
basic point is that sometimes any way in which an objective
is obtained will result in some damages, it is not really
possible to predict which way will produce the least harm,
and in those circumstances the necessity of a timely response
overrules the felt need to be cautious.
==[Ways around some of the costs]==
善用兵者，役不再籍，糧不三載，取用於國，因糧於敵，
故軍食可足也。
Those who are good at using warfare do not impress
individuals for service over and over again. They do
not make multiple exactions on the population for
grain and other supplies. Secure one's own weapons
and other needed utilities within one's own nation,
and depend on enemy territories for grain and other
resources when abroad. In that way there will be
sufficient food and similar resources for the troops.
==[the bill]==
國之貧於師者遠輸，遠輸則百姓貧。
When a nation's resources are depleted by its troops,
that is a defeat looming on its horizon.//Or, it's because
of long supply lines//
When there is a defeat on the horizon//Or,, when there
are long supply lines, the ordinary people are
[likely to already be] impoverished.
近[于]師者貴賣，貴賣則百姓竭，財竭則急於丘役。
When troops are stationed nearby, then commodity
prices rise. When commodity prices rise, the ordinary
people are driven out of the market. When the
resources of the ordinary people are exhausted [by
paying the high prices], that will create a furor
over impositions.
力屈財殫,中原內虛於家。百姓之費，十去其七﹔
When one's energies are entangled and one's wealth is
exhausted within one's nuclear region, then the center
of one's own domain becomes a void. The common people
will come up short on seventy percent of their
ordinary living expenses.
公家之費﹕破車罷馬，甲冑矢弩，戟盾蔽櫓，丘牛大
車，十去其六。
As for the expenses of the establishment families,
there are wrecked vehicles, infirm horses, [damaged or
destroyed] //armor//breastplates//, helmets, arrows,
crossbows, lances, shields, //screens//mantlets//, and
oars, not to mention light and heavy freight wagons.
Losses will amount to six parts in ten.
故智將務食於敵。食敵一<鐘>[鍾]，當吾二十<鐘>[鍾]﹔艸 稈一石，
當吾二十石。[-----鍾 = 640 liters(豆)。]
Therefore the wise general will put the burden for
foodstuffs on the enemy. Eating one unit of the
enemy's food will save the expense of twenty units of
one's own food. Feeding one unit of hay or fodder of
the enemy's will save the expenditure of twenty units
of one's own forage.
==[]==
故殺敵者，怒也﹔取敵之利者，貨也。
Truly, killing the enemy is a matter of wrath; on the
other hand, taking the profits of the enemy can be
with the [utilitarian, rational] intention of giving
one's soldiers their booty.
故車戰，得車十乘以上，賞其先得者，而更其旌旗，
Truly, as for chariot warfare, one should reward those
who first take more than ten [enemy] chariots, and
give them a new banner [for the captured chariots].
車雜而乘之，卒善以養之，是謂勝敵而益強。
By thus forming an irregular collection of chariots, and
by treating the captured soldiers well one may win
against the enemy and supplement one's own strength
[in the process].
故兵貴勝，不貴久。
Therefore in warfare value victory, negatively value
taking a long time at it.
知兵之將，民之司命，國家安危之主也。
The general who has knowledge of the armies and the
command of the people is the sovereign determiner of
the peace and the perils of the nation and its people.\\
========================================================
<3>《孫子兵法》第三篇 謀攻
Master Sun's Way of War. Chapter Three.
Planning attack. (A "planning" attack.)
孫子曰﹕
Master Sun said:
凡用兵之法，
In all cases, the principle for the use of warfare is
as follows:
全國為上，破國次之﹔
Maintaining the integrity of the [target] nation is
more valuable than destroying it.
全軍為上，破軍次之﹔
Maintaining [a target] army whole is more valuable
than destroying it.
全旅為上，破旅次之﹔
Preserving an entire battalion is of greater
importance than destroying a it.
全卒為上，破卒次之﹔
Maintaining a company is of the greater importance
than destroying it.
[[PEM: The standard strength of a company was 100
soldiers.]]
全伍為上，破伍次之。
Maintaining the existence of a squad is more
importance, than destroying it.
[[PEM: The standard strength of a squad was 5
soldiers.]]
是故百戰百勝，非善之善者也﹔
For the above reasons, to achieve one hundred
victories in one hundred engagements is not the
highest good.
不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者也。
To not engage and yet to entangle the other side's
soldiers is the highest good.
{{PEM: If you can avoid fighting then the obstreperous
troops of other countries, then they may fight among
themselves, leaving your own situation un-degraded
but leaving them both in much worse condition.
The desideratum is always to control the enemy not to
destroy the enemy. The unit of the other side that is
under one's own indirect control can be used for one's
own purposes.
PEM: During the Korean War, Chinese forces used
brainwashing techniques on captured UN forces. Their
primary objective in so doing was to foil organized
resistance, thus permitting them to use troops on
the battlefield that would otherwise be needed to
maintain control of the prisoner of war camps.}}
==[ ]==
故上兵伐謀，其次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城。
攻城之法為不得已。
For that reason, the highest level of warfare attacks
the enemy's planning. The next level attacks the
enemy's communications or alliances. The next level
attacks their soldiers. At the level below that one
attacks their fortifications. Attacking fortifications
is only to be done when there is no other alternative.
==[Besieging a city]==
修櫓轒轀，具器械，三月而後成，
The preparation of all the siege tools necessary for
attacking fortifications requires three months.
距閩又三月而後已。
Piling ramps against the enemy's walls will require
an additional three months.
將不勝其忿，而蟻附之，殺士卒三分之一，而城不拔者，此
攻之災也。
Supposing that the general could still not slake his
fury, and required his troops to swarm over the walls
like ants pouring out of their ant hill, and for that
reason kills off one third of his knights and common
soldiers, and yet would be unable to take out the
fortifications of the opposition, this would be a
calamity brought on by one's own attack.
==[Rather than that extreme...]==
故善用兵者，
So those who are good at warfare:
屈人之兵而非戰也。
Entangle the other side's soldiers without fighting.
拔人之城而非攻也，
Take out the other side's fortifications without
making an attack.
毀人之國而非久也。
Destroy the other side's nation without taking a long
time in doing so.
必以全爭於天下，故兵不頓而利可全，此謀攻之法也。
Ultimately, one must make a complete engagement with
all under Heaven, so in this way one's soldiers will
not lose their edge and yet benefits can be maximized.
This is the method of attacking [solely] through the
use of planning.
{{Analysis: Major Point 1}}
{{PEM: One way to interpret this passage would make it
inconsistent with the text above. He first says that
one should fight only as a last resort. then he lists
priorities that favor situations no-fight no-lose
conclusions, and then he seems to advise making a
war all over the world as it was then known. He has to
mean that the best general will have a total
battlefield awareness of "all under Heaven" and will
at most take a "let's you and him fight" stance.
The "struggle" is ideally all on the level of being so
well defended and so well prepared that nothing in the
world can sink a barb in you.}}
{{PEM: On the practicalities of this matter, Finland
during the Soviet period was not occupied be the
USSR. Nevertheless it had to go along quietly with
whatever the USSR wanted. It couldn't join NATO, and
the Finns had to be careful about what they said.
Evidently the Soviets figured that indirect control
was better than an invasion, NATO retaliation, and
either losing or else having to keep high troop levels
tied down there.}}
==[How to use troops]==
故用兵之法，
So the method for using troops is as follows:
十則圍之，五則攻之，倍則分之；
If your strength is ten to their one, then surround
them. If your strength is five to their one, then
attack them. If your strength is double theirs then
divide them.
{{PEM: Later he says that if you surround an army you
should give it a way to escape the blockade -- the
idea being that you would rather have them go back
where they came from, or, if they
seem not likely to go home and stay home, a corridor
of flight may be offered to them, and it can be a long
killing field through which their troops will continue
to flee even as the near end of the corridor is
closed off and as they are being culled from both
sides as they flee.}}
敵則能戰之，少則能逃/守之，不若則能避之。
If one is their worthy opponent, then one can fight
them. If one is numerically inferior, then one can
flee them/take a completely defensive posture
with regard to them. If one is not at all a match
for them, then be able to avoid them entirely.
{{PEM: To "avoid them entirely," one's intelligence
service must be equal to the task of telling your
soldiers where to go and where not to go.}}
故小敵之堅，大敵之擒也。
So by obdurateness a minor combatant can become the
captive of the major combatant.
{{PEM: Continuing the idea above, why would a
numerically inferior army willingly meet a superior
force on an equal footing? The only way the
numerically inferior army can win is by ambush
or other stratagems that prevent more than a small
portion of the other army from getting at them.}}
==[]==
夫將者，國之輔也。輔周則國必強，輔隙則國必弱。
Now a general is an aide to the nation. If his
assistance is well rounded, then the nation must be
strong. But if his assistance has lapses in it, then
the nation must be weak.
故君之所以患於軍者三﹕
Truly, there are three ways in which a sovereign can
be an affliction upon his army:
不知軍之不可以進而謂之進，不知軍之不可以退而謂之退，
是為縻軍﹔
(1) To be unaware that the army will be unable to
advance and yet order it to go forward, or to be
unaware that the army will be unable to retreat and
yet order it to do so, is called hamstringing the
army.
不知三軍之事，而同三軍之政<者>，則軍士惑矣﹔
(2) To not know the inner working of the three armies
and yet personally take on the administration of all
three armies is to contrive the chaos of the armies
and of their officers.
不知三軍之權，而同三軍之任，則軍士疑矣。
(3) To not know the balances of power within the three
armies and yet hold responsibility for the three of
them is to cause the armies and their officers to lose
confidence.
{{PEM: The king gets involved and messes up what his
general staff has been trying to get done.}}
三軍既惑且疑，則諸侯之難至矣，是謂亂軍引勝。
When the three armies fall into chaos and lose
confidence, then disaster will come upon one from the
lords (i.e., the subsidiary power centers within one's
or near to own nation. A typical example would be that of the
feudal domains that fought for dominancy in Japan).
This is called throwing one's own army into chaos and
drawing nigh the victory [of one's opponents}}.
==[If one can avoid the above dangers...]==
故知勝有五﹕
So it is known that victory has five factors:
知可以戰與不可以戰者勝，
Those who know when it is all right to go to war and
when it is not all right to go to war will have
victory.
識眾寡之用者勝，
Those who recognize the way to use both forces that
are superior and inferior in number to the opposition
will have victory.
上下同欲者勝，
Those who see to it that those who are socially
superior and those who are socially inferior have the
same desires will have victory.
以虞待不虞者勝，
Those who will put the forewarned in wait for the
heedless will have victory.
將能而君不御者勝。
The generals who have ability and who do not suffer
the opposition of their sovereigns will have victory.
此五者，知勝之道也。
These five things are the ways by which one may
recognize victory.
故曰﹕
So it is said:
知己，知彼，百戰不殆﹔
Know yourself, and know the other side. Then in one
hundred conflicts you will not be in peril.
不知彼，而知己，一勝一負﹔
If you do not know the other side yet know yourself,
you will win some and lose some.
不知彼，不知己，每戰必敗。
If you neither know the other side nor know yourself,
then in every battle you must face defeat.
<4>《孫子兵法》第四篇 軍形
Master Sun's Way of Warfare.
Chapter Four. Military formations.
孫子曰﹕
Master Sun said:
昔之善戰者，先為不可勝，以待敵之可勝。不可勝在己，可
勝在敵。
Those in antiquity who were good at warfare first made
sure that they could not be overcome in order to wait
for such time as the enemy could be overcome. Being
unconquerable is something that one can arrange on
one's own behalf. Their being susceptible to
conquest depends on them.
故善戰者，能為不可勝，不能使敵必可勝。
Truly, those who are good at warfare can make
themselves unconquerable, but they cannot make it so
that the enemy must fall in defeat.
故曰﹕勝可知，而不可為。
So it is said: One can understand about victory, but
one cannot make it happen.
==[Invincibility and its contrary]==
不可勝者，守也﹔
Being invincible is a matter of self protection.
可勝者，攻也。
Being defeatable is a matter of oneself going on the
attack.
{{PEM In hand to hand combat, "protecting oneself" has
at least two aspects. On the one hand, one can wall
oneself off from attack by always staying barricaded
at home or something of that sort. The problem with
that approach is that one becomes one's own prisoner.
Going about town in a tank is not much better.
PEM: Walking down the street one can do much toward
self protection by things such as not giving off
victim vibrations, not walking into obviously dicey
situations, not flashing lots of cash, etc. That kind
of protection can go on right up to the moment that
an assailant gets to within striking distance. At the
point that one's back is to the wall, at the point
when there is no way of escape, if the assailant
persists in preparations for attack, and those
preparatory moves may only take an additional second
or so, it is not at all clear that one can be
invincible. One's "mistake" was not to have stayed at
home, not to have tried to come to the aid of a
damsel in distress, etc.
PEM: This is the situation that is specific to the
training of a martial artist. Many people will have
other kinds of preparation to avoid attacks, and their
ways will succeed or fail depending on circumstances.
Many people will carry a pistol or other defensive
weapon. But pulling a pistol puts one in the situation
of possibly having to use it -- and of then hesitating
to use it due to psychological manipulation by one's
assailant, awareness of a possible felony charge, etc.
PEM: Maas Ayoob says to be sure to make sure any
witnesses hear you say: "Don't threaten me. Put that
gun down," etc., not only in the hope that they may
intervene but also in case you hurt your assailant so
that it does not appear that you were the felon.
PEM: The key point that Master Sun is making, I think,
is that there are disadvantages of going on the
attack. The reason, especially in a self defense
situation on the street, is that whoever attacks first
has to commit and the person who waits the attack
has great freedom of movement with no countervailing
momentum to overcome. One the attacker is in motion
(or, if the defender is good enough to do a sen no sen
(a "before the before" defense is one in which the
other person starts before the defender begins to
move, but the defender still makes a counter-strike
before the original attack can be completed.) defense,
just at the instant the attacker mentally goes into
motion) he is committed to one course of action and
changing his course of action will require resisting
his own inertia. The defender, however, can go to
either side, can step back, or can even step forward
and totally disrupt most unarmed attacks. The mongoose
knows how to defeat the cobra.}}
守則不足，攻則有餘。
In the case of self protection there may be
insufficiency.
{{PEM: Self-protectiveness can be an indication that
one does not believe oneself to have tactical
superiority.}}
In the case of attack there may be an excess.
{{PEM: Aggressiveness can be an indication that one
believes oneself to have the upper hand. On the other
hand, it may be bluster.}}
善守者，藏於九地之下﹔
Those who are good at self protection treasure
resources away in all quadrants of the country.
{{PEM: Resilience.}}
善攻者，動於九天之上。
Those who are good at attack move over all the land.
{{PEM: Mobility.}}
故能自保而全勝也。
So [having the two strengths] one is able to protect
oneself and also have complete victory.
{{PEM: One is not tied down to any heavy defenses in
one's own country but can melt and reform, never far
from known caches.}}
==[ What constitutes victory and what constitutes defeat? ]==
見勝不過眾人之所知，非善之善者也﹔
The ability to see "victory" does not exceed what the
multitudes are able to understand, and it is not the
best of all good abilities.
戰勝而天下曰善，非善之善者也。
When a battle is won everyone on earth says that is
good, but it is not the best of all good outcomes.
故舉秋毫不為多力，
Now lifting a hair from the winter coat of an animal
is not deemed an extreme of strength.
見日月不為明目，
Seeing the sun or the moon is not credited as being
acute vision.
聞雷霆不為聰耳。
Hearing crashes of thunder is not called acute
hearing.
==[Push-overs vs. real fights]==
古之所謂善戰者，勝於易勝者也。
Those in antiquity who were good at warfare won under
circumstances where it was easy to win.
故善戰之勝也，無智名，無勇功。
Therefore those who won good wars did not get a name
for being wise, nor were they accredited merit for
their bravery.
故其戰勝不忒。
So their war victories were not celebrated in an
extravagant way.
不忒者，其所措必勝，勝已敗者也。
The plans executed by the un-extravagant had to have
succeeded.
They won out over those who were already defeated.
故善戰者，先立於不敗之地，而不失敵之敗也。
So those who are good at warfare first establish
themselves in an invincible position, and then take
care not to let go of the defeat of their enemies [if
it is offered to them].
是故勝兵,先勝而後求戰，敗兵,先戰而後求勝。
So victorious armies will first win and only then seek
warfare. Losing armies will first go to war and only
later seek [the way to achieve] victory.
==[ ]==
善用兵者，修道而保法，故能為勝敗之政。
Those who are good at using troops will mend their Dao
and protect their laws so that they will be able to
conduct a governance that wins out over defeat.
{{PEM: The Dao or Way mentioned here is probably the
same as that mentioned at the beginning of this book.
It is the set of beliefs and aspirations that the
ruler has nurtured throughout society.}}
兵法﹕一曰度，二曰量，三曰數，四曰稱，五曰勝。
The ways of warfare:
The first is called a metric.
{{PEM: The character is used to speak of marks
inscribed in some artifact such as a bronze measuring
rod. So the primary sense would be a linear measure of
something.}}
The second is called measure.
{{PEM: Knowledge about favorable and unfavorable
conditions would be according to some metric being
applied to make actual measures. While a dù 度 is a
measure of length, a liàng 量 is a measure of
volume. There may be some idea of going from abstract
characterizations such as length to more concrete
characteristics such as the area or the volume of
something. Or perhaps the two terms are related in the
same general ways as distances to travel are related
to the volumes of food and water that must be provided
for the trip.}}
The third is called enumeration.
{{PEM: Planning things out step by step, e.g., how
much fodder for the oxen and horses is really required
to get from here to there?
{{PEM: Knowing what the conditions really are. Using
the metrics and real measures to actually determine
what is what, and then setting things in some useful
order.}}
The fourth is called weighing and evaluation.
{{PEM: This part is operational and is based on the
previous three steps being in place. How are things
going at each step? Put the measured conditions of
one's troops and one's oppositions on the balance
scale.}}
The fifth is called victory.
{{PEM: If the above four steps are well handled, one
will not put oneself on the offensive when one is not
going to be adequately prepared and thereby get
defeated.}}
地生度，度生量，量生數，數生稱，稱生勝。
Geography (lay of the land, the terrain) produces
metrics.
{{PEM:It imposes a metric somehow. Maybe it just
means that the distance from my capital to their
capital determines how far they must come to
attack me.}}
Metrics produce measures.
{{PEM: In addition to being able to make simple
measurements of area, volume, weight, etc., one can
measure more abstract conditions such as the current
effectiveness range of a certain regiment. If one has
a metric, a way to measure conditions, then one can
form measures of the conditions of one's army, the
opposition's army, etc.}}
Measure produces enumeration (i.e., calculations).
{{PEM: Once the statistics are in, one can do
calculations.}}
Enumeration produces weighing [one thing against
another in the balance].
{{PEM: With the statistics in hand one can do
realistic. objective, comparisons.}}
Enumeration (evaluation at each step for each metric)
produces victory.
{{PEM: The rule is: Do not attack when one is in an
inferior position. Attack only when the enemy has
already assured his defeat and you know it. These
judgments must be objective. They must be based on
empirical evidence and not on wishful thinking.}}
==[Overwhelming force]==
故勝兵若以鎰稱銖，敗兵若以銖稱鎰。
Truly, using victorious armies resembles using a full
measure of gold to weigh against 1/24 measure of gold.
Using losing armies resembles using 1/24th measure of
gold to weigh against a full measure of gold.
{{PEM: This comment validates the notes given above.
Master Sun seems to prefer a quantitative superiority,
in any battle to be undertaken, of about twenty-five
to one.}}
勝者之戰，若決積水於千仞之谿者，形也。
The warfare of a victor is like the cutting loose of
impounded water over a ravine of a thousand rods depth
-- the whole thing is thereafter only a matter of the
lay of the land.
{{PEM: This sentence gives a good example of a 勢 shì
(power configuration.) Having water is not enough.
Having impounded water is not, in itself, worth much
more. But having impounded water in a location that
assures that if released it will deliver un-resistable
force in a particular direction or against a
particular point of opposition gives one a kind of
real power in the world. Note that having introduced
the idea here, the next chapter goes on to discuss
power configurations in detail.}}
<5>《孫子兵法》第五篇 兵勢
Master Sun's Art of War.
Chapter Five. The power configurations of armies.
孫子曰：
Master Sun said:
凡治眾如治寡，分數是也﹔
In all cases, regulating the multitudes is no
different from regulating small groups -- it is a
matter of dividing the numbers of them up.
{{PEM: Raw power is not enough. Power can be directed
against larger or smaller objectives as one choses.}}
鬥眾如鬥寡，形名是也﹔
Taking on a multitude in combat is like taking on a
small group in combat -- it is a matter of giving form
to names.
{{PEM: The Daoist view is that no divisions exist in
nature. All divisions are imposed by minds. One may at
one time see a single army, a much larger entity than
one's own army. But by an act of mind one can see the
one-fourth part of the enemy's army that has crossed
the river as one army, the army to be demolished by
one's own larger army, and the three-fourth part of
the enemy's army effectively isolated by the river as
another army to be dealt with at some later time.
Asymmetrical warfare often works by small and
highly mobile forces taking on isolated enemy
objectives and then quickly melting away.}}
三軍之眾，可使必受敵而無敗者，奇正是也﹔
The multitudes composing the three armies can be
caused to have to accept enemy [assaults] yet suffer
no defeats -- it is a matter of deception versus
uprightness.
兵之所加，如以碫投卵者，虛實是也。
When soldiers pile on, it is [or should be] like
throwing a whetstone on eggs -- a matter of solids
versus voids.
凡戰者，以正合，以奇勝。
In all warfare, engagements occur on the up and up,
but it is by deception or misdirection that one wins.
故善出奇者，無窮如天地，不竭如江河。
So those who are good in the ways of deception are
boundless like Heaven and Earth, un-diminishable like
the Yangtze and the Yellow Rivers.
終而復始，日月是也。死而復生，四時是也。
Coming to the end they begin again, just as do the
days and months.
Dying and they come to life again, just as do the four
seasons.
==[Five phases mention, any theory? ]==
聲不過五，五聲之變，不可勝聽也。
There are no more than five notes in the musical
scale, but the changes that can be rung on those five
notes are infinite in our hearing.
{{PEM: By a kind of analogy to the five visible
planets (regarded as gods in China as in the ancient
Western world), the Chinese listed fives of other
kinds of things that were keyed to the lists of
the planets. So Mars and the color red were
associated, for instance.}}
色不過五，五色之變，不可勝觀也。
There are no more than five colors, yet the changes
that can be produced among them exceed our powers of
discrimination.
味不過五，五味之變，不可勝嘗也。
There are only five flavors to our palates, yet the
changes among them exceed our powers of taste.
==[Two, any theory?]==
戰勢不過奇正，奇正之變，不可勝窮也。
The power configurations of warfare do not exceed the
deceptive and the straightforward, yet the changes
that can be rung on these two are inexhaustible.
奇正相生，如循環之無端，孰能窮之哉﹖
Deception and straightforwardness produce each other,
like the endlessness of a circulatory system. Who
could terminate such a loop?
激水之疾，至於漂石者，勢也﹔
When sufficiently agitated, water can carry away
stones. This is an example of a power configuration
(i.e., a configuration that channels power into a target
in an effective way).
鷙鳥之疾，至於毀折者，節也。
The ferocity of raptors can rise to the point of
destruction [of their prey]. This is on account of
inflections.
{{PEM: Bamboo has sections. In what sense do raptors
have "sections"? Their actions involve sudden changes
in directions that are under their control. For
instance, the fastest falcons glide in circular
patterns until they spot something, dive at terrific
speeds, seize their prey at speed, and yet manage not
to crash into the ground.}}
==[ power configurations]==
是故善戰者，其勢險，其節短；
For this reason, those who are good at warfare keep
their power configurations abrupt and and cause the
inflections of their movements to occur over short
periods of time.
{{PEM: In other words, changes at least metaphorically
involve sharp turns at high speeds. Fighter pilot and
(later) military strategist John Boyd (USAF) was the
first to recognize that, assuming general speed
equivalence, the plane that could turn more sharply
and also both decelerate and accelerate more rapidly
was superior in a dogfight.}}
勢如彍弩，節如發機。
A power configuration is like the drawing of a
crossbow. An inflection is like firing it.
{{PEM: In drawing a crossbow, energy is added to a
mechanical system by slowly pulling, or even cranking,
the bowstring back until it engages with the trigger
mechanism where it is held in readiness to be released
over a very short period of time and in a particular
direction. Note that in the beginning force is
directed away from the arrow point, and at the
inflection point force suddenly begins to be directed
toward the arrow point. The crossbow has parts that
are arranged to direct power along a definite
configuration or path, and a trigger that is a movable
lever with no great mechanical leverage or strength of
its own but is yet something that touches off a great
change of state in a short time.)
紛紛紜紜鬥亂，而不可亂也。渾渾沌沌形圓，而不可敗也。
In the fog of armed struggle and disorder, one cannot
permit oneself to become mentally disordered. One must
be indefinite in outline, chaotic in appearance, and
yet inherently cohesive, so that one cannot be
defeated.
{{PEM: Metaphorically, one always wants to be like a
crossbow bolt that quickly shoots into action. One
does not want to be like a crossbow that shatters and
releases its pent up energy futilely in all
directions.}}
==[deception]==
亂生於治，怯生於勇，弱生於強。
Disorder is produced out of order. Cowardice is
produced out of bravery. Weakness is produced out of
strength.
{{PEM: is he talking about real or simulated disorder,
etc.? Regardless, one cannot have disorder unless
there is something that was originally well ordered,
and entropy will produce disorder over time unless
repairs are made on a timely basis.}}
治亂，數也﹔ 勇怯，勢也﹔ 強弱，形也。
Bringing order to disorder is a matter of mentally
imposed regularity. Producing bravery out of cowardice
is a matter of power configurations. Bringing strength
out of weakness is a matter of structuring things.
故善動敵者，形之，敵必從之﹔
Truly, those who are good at moving their adversaries
around do so by giving a form to things such that the
enemy must follows those structures.
{{PEM: The enemy army is a source of energy in itself.
Originally that energy is being directed in directions
intended to be hurtful to the defender. The defender,
however, can create structures (sometimes that are
little more than illusions) that channel the enemy's
energy the way dikes and dams channel the energy of a
river.}}
予之，敵必取之。以利動之，以卒待之。
If I offer something, the enemy must take it. That is
using benefit to move him. But one has soldiers in
wait for him.
{{PEM: The Zhuang Zi mentions a general Daoist
strategy called 兩行 liǎng xíng. Literally those words
mean "two displacements," i.e., going two different
ways. At a deeper level it means doing something that
will have two potential outcomes. Both outcomes
depend on what one's counterpart does. Consider two
different examples.
(1) A house is discovered to have been booby-trapped
by installing bomb triggers in random places in the
cellar. The bombs are secretly removed, but the police
would like to know which of several aides to the owner
of the house has planned the assassination.
Questioning anyone would reveal that the plot has
been discovered. So the owner of the house is
instructed to invite each of the aides to come to
dinner with his wife and children on a particular
night. The family dog is in an adjacent room and has
been taught to bark incessantly as soon as people come
into the dining room. So soon after dinner starts the
host calls out to the housekeeper, "Martha, please
make the dog go down to the basement."
(2) In an unprovoked fight the defender notices that
the attacker has a pattern of using a left jab as a
feint and following with a solid right. Defender
therefore throws a left jab. The opponent then has a
choice of treating it as a feint and immediately going
in for the kill, or defending. If the left jab is
indeed blocked, defender has lost nothing. If,
however, the jab is not blocked (perhaps defender made
it appear to be a half-hearted attempt), following
through will strike the original attacker. One
does not have to have mastered a three inch knockout
blow to create enough damage to permit escape from the
whole situation, or at least set one's opponent up for
a strong second attack with the opposite hand.}}
故善戰者，求之於勢，不責於人，故能擇人任勢。
So those who are good at warfare seek it through power
configurations and do not put the onus on individuals.
They are therefore able to select individuals to take
charge of the power configurations.
{{PEM:--Like the man whose finger pulls the crossbow
trigger.}}
{{PEM: One example of what Master Sun is talking about
in this section might be optical illusions. If objects
are used, they may be real objects. If lines are drawn
they will be real lines. However, the conclusions that
eyes draw from optical illusions are incorrect. }}
任勢者，其戰人也，如轉木石。
Those who are given responsibility for operating a
power configuration are warriors, and they are like
rotating wood or stone (in the trigger mechanism of
the crossbow).
木石之性，安則靜，危則動，方則止，圓則行。
The natures of wood and stone are to be still if
things are at peace, but to move if they are under
duress. If they are square, then they will not turn,
but if they are round then they will move.
{{PEM: The trigger mechanism of a crossbow is formed
of rectangular elements that are designed to retain
their positions in resistance to considerable force,
and curved elements that are designed to move without
having to be subjected to much force.}}
故善戰人之勢，如轉圓石於千仞之山者，勢也。
Therefore those who are good at the power
configurations of war are like those who can roll a
round stone that is poised on the top of a thousand
rod mountain -- it is a matter of power
configurations.
{{PEM: The stone must be round if it is to be easily
rolled off its stable perch, but the lever and the
fulcrum need to be "square" so that they will hold
their positions as force is applied.}}
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
<6>《孫子兵法》第六篇 虛實
Master Sun's Art of War
Chapter Six. Void and Plenum
{{PEM: Once again, the material in the preceding
chapter introduces the main idea of the next section.
Even the most basic trigger movement consists of a bar
with a round void in it that goes over a very solid
round peg upon which it turns.}}
孫子曰﹕
Master Sun said:
凡先處戰地而待敵者佚，後處戰地而趨戰者勞。
It is always the case that those who first occupy the
battlefield and await arrival of the enemy have ample
time on their hands, whereas those who arrive later
and must scramble to engage will endure toil.
{{PEM: Note that the ideal situation for meeting the
enemy may be an opening leading to an open space where
a strongly shielded ambush has been laid.}}
故善戰者，致人而不致於人也。
So those who are good at warfare will draw in the
enemy and will not permit themselves to be drawn in by
the enemy.
能使敵自至者，利之也﹔
If one is able to cause the enemy to arrive, that is
to be done by offering him some benefit.
能使敵不得至者，害之也。
If one is able to cause the enemy to be unable to
arrive, that is to be done by injuring him.
{{PEM: The Sichuan Basin was one part of China that
was never conquered by the Japanese during World War
II. The reason was that Sichuan is entirely surrounded
by mountains except for the water route provided by
the Yangtze River. The water flow is very rapid, and
the sides of the channel are precipitous. Therefore
any forces trying to enter would have to go up river
and through miles of ambushing forces on higher
ground.
==[Offensive]==
故敵佚能勞之，飽能飢之，安能動之。
So if the enemy is at ease one can cause him to toil,
if he is well fed, one can cause him hunger, and if at
rest one can cause him to have to be on the move.
出其所必趨，趨其所不意。
[To do so,] appear out of the places to which the
enemy must hasten, but hasten to the places where you
will not be expected.
行千里而不勞者，行於無人之地也。
Those who go for a thousand li without toil are those
who pass through areas where there are no people.
{{PEM: One li is equal to about 1/3 English mile.}}
{{PEM: During the Pacific campaign in World War II,
one prominent motto (associated with Admiral Halsey)
was: "Hit 'em where they ain't!" Well defended islands
were not attacked, but cut off from being resupplied.
Poorly defended islands were captured when useful
to the Allies for any purpose. Otherwise, the fleet
moved through the open waters.}}
攻而必取者，攻其所不守也。
In cases where one must succeed in an attack, attack
the points at which the enemy has no defenses.
守而必固者，守其所不攻也。
In cases where one must firmly defend a position,
defend a position that the enemy will not attack.
{{PEM: Peaks are easily defended. With preparation,
mountains can be hollowed out to provide living spaces
for entire armies.}}
故善攻者，敵不知其所守。善守者，敵不知其所攻。
So in the case of those who are good at attack, their
enemies will not know where their defenses ought to be
located. And in the case of those who are good at
defense, the enemy will not know where they ought to
attack.
{{PEM: One of the difficulties in guerrilla warfare is
that insurgents disappear among the ordinary farmers
and other citizens. They have no fortress to attack,
no camps to overrun. One alternative to highly
concentrated emplacements in mountains and man-made
fortifications is to disperse troops so widely that no
one point of attack is better than any other. Between
these extremes are defenses such as the tunnels
constructed by the Vietcong that were hard to find,
and sometimes so extensive that defenders could leave
by another portal when attackers made entry at any
point. This strategy is probably millions of years
old. Some trapdoor spiders maintain parallel vertical
tunnels, one with the "front door" covered by a
carefully constructed plug-like, hinged door, and the
other, joined to the first by a short horizontal
tunnel with its own door near the bottom, that the
spider would need to dig the last bit through to
escape.}}
微乎微乎，至於無形；神乎神乎，至於無聲，故能為敵之司
命。
Subtle, oh subtle, to the point of being formless.
Spirit-like, oh spirit-like, to the point of being
inaudible.
Thereby one is able to function as the grim reaper of
the enemy.
進而不可禦者，衝其虛也﹔
To advance without the possibility of defense, attack
the enemy's voids.
退而不可追者，速而不可及也。
To retreat without the possibility of pursuit, be too
rapid to be caught.
故我欲戰，敵雖高壘深溝，不得不與我戰者，攻其所必救也﹔
Truly, if I desire to fight, then even though the
enemy has high fortifications and deep moats, he will
have no choice other than to fight with me, for I will
attack the points that he has no choice but to try to
rescue.
我不欲戰，雖畫地而守之，敵不得與我戰者，乖其所之也。
If I do not desire to fight, even though I may have
only sectioned off my camping area as the full extent
of my "defenses," the enemy will be unable to engage
me in a fight because I have diverted his arrival.
{{PEM: On the surface this part seems improbable.
Maybe the idea is to create a false line of travel and
lead the enemy to attack an empty camp.}}
故形人而我無形，則我專而敵分﹔
So I shape other people up as I wish and yet I have no
form, and in that way I cohere and the enemy is split
asunder.
我專為一，敵分為十，是以十攻其一也，則我眾而敵寡﹔
能以眾擊寡者，則吾之所與敵者，約矣。
If I cohere as one, but the enemy is divided into ten
separate forces, then that will mean my ten (out of
ten, i.e. all my forces) attacking his one (out of
ten), and I will be many while the enemy is few. If
one can use a multitude to strike a small force, then
what choices I give to the enemy are highly
restricted.
吾所與戰之地不可知；不可知，則敵所備者多；敵所備者
多，則吾之所戰者寡矣。
The places where I intend to give battle must be made
unknowable. If they are unknowable, then the points
where the enemy must prepare defenses are many. If the
places where the enemy must prepare defenses are many,
then the forces at whichever point I actually attack
will be few.
故備前則後寡，備後則前寡；
So if they prepare to defend the front then their rear
defenses will be sparse, and if they prepare to defend
their rear then their front defenses will be weak.
故備左則右寡，備右則左寡；
Then if they prepare on the left flank, their right
will be weakly defended, or if they prepare on the
right flank then their left defenses will be sparse.
無所不備，則無所不寡。
If there is nowhere they fail to prepare defenses,
then everywhere will be weakly defended.
寡者，備人者也；
The ones who are short-handed are the ones who must
make preparations against others.
眾者，使人備己者也。
The ones who are not short-handed are the ones who
force others to prepare [multiple] defenses against
them.
{{PEM: Asymmetrical warfare.}}
The few are the ones who must prepare people.
The large contingents are the ones that cause others
to prepare themselves.
==[Place and time for maximum effect]==
故知戰之地，知戰之日，則可千里而會戰。
So if one knows the location of warfare and knows the
time of warfare, then one can join in the battle even
over a difference of one thousand li.
不知戰之地，不知戰之日，則左不能救右，右不能救左，前
不能救後，後不能救前，而況遠者數十里，近者數里乎﹖
If one does not know the place of warfare, and/or does
not know the time of warfare, then those on the left
cannot come to the aid of those on the right, and
those on the right cannot come to the aid of those on
the left, those is front cannot come to the aid of
those at the rear, and those at the rear cannot come
to the aid of those at the front. How much the less
could those distant forces who are several tens of li
away, or even nearer forces that are still several li
away. be able to give succor?
{{PEM: I think he may be talking about coming to the
aid of your own forces. If you are spread out far from
left to right, and sparse at that, then when attacked
on the left the ones on the right might not even know
about it.}}
以吾度之，越人之兵雖多，亦奚益於勝哉﹖﹗
By my estimate, although the forces of the state of
Yue are many, of what benefit will that be toward
their victory?
故曰﹕勝可為也。敵雖眾，可使無鬥。
So it is said: Victory can be achieved. Although the
enemy is many, he can be caused not to contend.
==[Pushing their buttons to achieve the above-
mentioned state of affairs]==
故
Truly:
策之而知得失之計，
By planning and preparation one can learn of the
opponent's calculations of gain and loss.
作之而知動靜之理，
By arousing them to action one can learn of their
patterns of action and repose.
形之而知死生之地，
By "shaping them up," one can learn to recognize the
safe places and the kill zones.
{{PEM: This sentence and the previous one have
parallel structures, so it is clear that the author
wants to make a parallel to "arouse them" in "form
them." If one encounters enemy troops that are not in
action, they may be in their tents, eating, or
resting. It may be difficult to get any idea
whatsoever as to whether they have hidden defenses
prepared, what their state of morale may be, etc. So
in order to assess these matters it may be helpful to
do something that will make them begin to put their
defensive plans into operation, and to take careful
note of what they do.}}
角之而知有餘不足之處。
By probing them one can differentiate the opponent's
places of ampleness and insufficiency.
故形兵之極，至於無形. ﹔無形，則深間不能窺，智者不能
謀。
So at the extreme of giving form to armies, one can
arrive at the formless. Without form, then even spies
in the depths one cannot descry anything, and so
those who are knowledgeable cannot make any plans
[against us].
因形而措勝於眾，眾不能知﹔人皆知我所以勝之形，而莫知
吾所以制勝之形。
Because of forms one is able to contrive victory over
superior forces. The multitudes cannot [be permitted
to] know what is happening to them. Everyone knows the
forms by which I achieve victory, yet none know the
method by which I create the forms that give victory.
故其戰勝不復，而應形無窮。
So my military victories are not repeated, and the
forms by which I respond (to the contingent realities
encountered in warfare) are boundless.
夫兵形象水，水之形避高而趨下，兵之形避實而擊虛，水因
地而制流，兵應敵而制勝。
==[mutability/inconstancy should be constant]==
Now the form of troops must resemble that of water.
The form of water is to avoid the heights and rush
toward the low places. The form of troops is to avoid
the solids (hard defenses) and attack the voids.
Water's flow is controlled by topography, and an
army's victory is controlled by responding to enemy
emplacements.
故兵無常勢，水無常形，能因敵變化而取勝者，謂之神。
So an army ought not to have a constant power
configuration just as water does not have a constant
form. The ability to respond to the changes of the
enemy and thereby secure victor is called being
"spirit-like."
==[permutations]==
故五行無常勝，四時無常位，日有短長，月有死生。
Truly, the five phases do not have a constant winner
among them, the four seasons do not fail to change
phase from one to the next, the days have variations
in length, and the moon waxes and wanes.
{{PEM: It would be a mistake for the general ever to
assume that environmental factors are going to remain
constant for long.}}
<7>《孫子兵法》第七篇 軍爭
Master Sun's Art of War. Seventh Chapter Military
Struggle
孫子曰﹕
Master Sun said:
凡用兵之法，將受命於君，合軍聚眾，交和而舍，莫難於軍
爭。
In all cases, the method of using troops is to take
one's commands from the sovereign, assemble the troops
and call together their supporting elements, cause
them all to blend together and take up common
residence, and there is nothing more difficult than
military struggles.
軍爭之難者，以迂為直，以患為利。
The thing that makes military struggles difficult is
when (or how to contrive that) those who are
convoluted are taken as the straightforward ones, and
when disadvantageous things are made to become
beneficial.
故迂其途，而誘之以利，後人發，先人至，此知迂直之計者
也。
So if one make the opposition's line of travel become
convoluted and then seduces them [out of their
intended path] by offering them inducements, though
one be later to set off than those other people, one
will yet arrive before they do. To do this kind of
thing means knowing the calculations of the convoluted
and the direct.
{{PEM: When speaking in abstract terms about the
maneuvers of armies, some things may seem entirely
mysterious and //counterintuitive// that can be
demonstrated more easily in concrete terms descriptive
of single combats.
{{PEM: Arriving before somebody else, who departed
earlier, may seem improbable on the battlefield, but
in karate one of the ideals is the technique that
displays "sen no sen" (lit. the before of before). It
refers to the ability of trained fighters to react to
some attacker who has moved first and yet to have the
counterattack take effect early enough to disrupt the
attack.
{{PEM: In the 1970s I observed a teaching interaction
between a black belt instructor in Taekwondo and a
junior student. The format was that the student would
attack with a single punch, the teacher would block
and counter attack, and then they would repeat this
process a predetermined number of times.
{{PEM: Since the attacker and the defender started at
a certain distance from each other, in order to strike
defender attacker had to step forward. At mid-stride,
at the point that attacker had moved to the point that
his knees and feet were closest together, defender had
already moved a full step back, and he had shifted his
center of gravity (i.e., his torso) back nearly over
the rear foot. At this point it would have been
extremely difficult for attacker to defeat his own
momentum and not continue moving forward. So attacker,
still intending to carry through with his attack, had
to step forward. However, when he launched his punch
he discovered that his target was just out of reach.
At this point, defender shifted his body weight
and was in perfect position to make his punch connect.
{{PEM: So even though attacker had started first,
defender was the first to connect with a blow.}}
==[positives and negatives]==
故軍爭為利，軍爭為危。
Truly, military struggles can bring benefits, but they
also can bring dangers.
舉軍而爭利，則不及。委軍而爭利，則輜重捐。
If one raises troops and only then contends for
benefits, then one will not arrive in time. If one
uses a partial army and still contends for benefits,
then one's supply wagons may be lost.
是故卷甲而趨，日夜不處，倍道兼行，
Therefore if we put our armor in supply wagons and
rush forth without wearing it (for the sake of speed),
stopping neither by day nor by night, and moving at
double time,
百里而爭利，則擒三將軍，勁者先，疲者後，其法十一而
至﹔
and so travel one hundred li in order to contend for
benefits, then the three generals will likely get
seized. The sturdy troops would get there first, and
the fatigued troops would arrive later, according to a
ratio of 1 to 10.
五十里而爭利，則蹶上將軍，其法半至﹔
If one were to contend for benefits at a distance of
50 li away, then one's superior general might be
thwarted, and the troops would arrive according to a
ratio of half.
三十里而爭利，則三分之二至。
If one were to contend for benefits at a distance of
30 li away, then two out of three would make it.
是故軍無輜重則亡，無糧食則亡，無委積則亡。
So an army will perish without its supply wagons. It
will perish without food provisions, It will perish
without its stores (see above).
==[ general intelligence ]==
故
不知諸侯之謀者，不能豫交﹔
Truly, those who do not know the consultations
occurring among members of the [other sides'] nobility
cannot make (anticipatory combinations =) alliances.
{{PEM:In a metaphorical sense, one must know the lay
of the land.}}
不知山林﹑險阻﹑沮澤之形者，不能行軍﹔
Those who do not know about mountains and forests,
rugged and obstructed terrain, and swamps and marshy
terrain, cannot deploy troops.
不用鄉導者，不能得地利。
Those who do not use local guides cannot take
advantage of the terrain.
{{PEM:This is a repeat, probably it is actually a
quotation used as a commentary from earliest times.}}
==[ ]==
故兵以詐立，以利動，以分和為變者也。
So warfare is established on the basis of deception,
moved along in the pursuit of benefit, and makes its
permutations by alternately separating into smaller
contingents and reuniting again later.
==[ Description of a desirable army]==
故
Truly,
其疾如風，
in haste it is like the wind,
其徐如林，
in repose it is like the forest,
侵掠如火，
in invading and plundering it is like the fire,
不動如山，
in remaining immobile it is like the mountain,
難知如陰，
in being inscrutable it is like the yin (the dark
side), and
動如雷震。
in action it is like thunder and earthquakes.
==[How to use such an army]==
掠鄉分眾，廓地分守，
Plunder the villages and divide [the spoils] up
[among] the masses of troops, enlarge one's boundaries
and divide everything into holdings (for sub-
commanders, et al.),
懸權而動，
Suspend things from the weighing bar and only then
move.
先知迂直之計者勝，此軍爭之法也。
Those who first know the plans and calculations of the
[convoluted and direct] will win. Such are the methods
of military conflict.
==[ ]==
軍政曰：言不相聞，故為金鼓，視不相見，故為旌旗。
"Military Administrators" says: When verbal
communications cannot be heard, then use brass (gongs)
and drums. When visual communications cannot be seen,
then use banners and flags.
夫金鼓旌旗者，所以一人之耳目也。
Now the gongs and drums and the banners and flags are
ways to unify the (ears and eyes =) attention of the
people.
人既專一，則勇者不得獨進，怯者不得獨退，此用眾之法
也。
Once the people are united, the bold ones will be
unable to advance independently, and the timid will
not be able to retreat independently. This is the
method for employing masses of people.
故夜戰多火鼓，畫戰多旌旗，所以變人之耳目也。
So during night battles one mostly depends on fire
signals and drums, but in daylight battles one mostly
uses banners and flags. In this way one responds to
the differing abilities (under the circumstances) of
ears and eyes.
==[ ]==
故三軍可奪氣，將軍可奪心。是故朝氣銳，晝氣惰，暮氣
歸。
Truly, one can snatch the lifebreath (élan vital,
spirit) of the Three Armies. One can rob the hearts
and minds of their generals. [How?] The spirit is
sharp and aggressive in the morning. It becomes
indolent in the middle of the day, and in the evening
it seeks to return to its safe abode.
故善用兵者，避其銳氣，擊其惰歸，此治氣者也。
So those who are adept at using soldiers avoid
expressions of the [opposition's] troops' aggressive
spirits, and attack during their indolence and desire
for respite. This is the way to control the spirits of
the troops.
以治待亂，以靜待譁，此治心者也。
Use [our] well trained [troops] to respond to [their]
(civil or military) disorder, use [our] tranquility to
respond to [their] clamor. This is the way to regulate
the minds of the troops.
{{PEM: This approach implies training beforehand so
that the troops will remain under control and tranquil
even in a battle.]
以近待遠，以佚待勞，以飽待飢，此治力者也。
Use [our] resources that are close at hand to treat
what is [threatening] at a distance. Use [our]
restedness to deal with [their] fatigue. Use [our]
satiety to deal with [their] famine. This is the
regularizing of power.
{{PEM: The basic idea, continuing from the above, is
to maintain a position where one's own resources are
close at hand, and then attackers from far away will
be forced to maintain a long supply line. Create
situations in which your own side can get rested
whereas the opposition get fatigued in the process of
getting at you.}}
無邀正正之旗，無擊堂堂之陣，此治變者也。
Do not join battle with armies that display perfectly
ordered flags. Do not attack those who are beautifully
deployed. That is the way to adapt to permutations.
==[Rules of thumb]==
故用兵之法，高陵勿向，背丘勿逆，佯卻勿從，銳卒勿攻，
餌兵勿食，歸師勿遏，圍師必闕，窮寇勿迫，
此用兵之法也。
Truly, the way to use soldiers is not to head toward
high places, Do not run counter to [those with] low
hills at the[ir] backs. Do not pursue a feigned
retreat. Do not attack crack troops. Do not bite
on troops that are offered as bait. Do not hinder
retreating armies. Surrounded armies must be offered a
way to sneak away. Do not corner desperate thugs.
These are the laws for using troops.
{{PEM: There is a difference between letting
surrounded troops move home en mass and in good order,
and letting them slowly straggle homeward.
In the latter case it will be difficult for them to
regroup, and many soldiers may desert on their way
home without supervision.]
<8>《孫子兵法》第八篇 九變
Master Sun's Art of War. Eighth Chapter
The Nine Permutations
孫子曰﹕
Master Sun says:
凡用兵之法，將受命於君，合軍聚眾，圮地無舍，衢地交
和，絕地勿留，圍地則謀，死地則戰。
According to the way of using warfare, the generals
receive commands from their sovereigns, they assemble
the armies and bring together the masses. They do not
take their abode in devastated lands, they maintain
harmonious communications across areas spanned by
concourses, but refuse to remain in places where they
can become isolated. If they are in areas that [start
to] get surrounded, they will [first] engage in
deceptions,
but if they face dead ends on all sides they will fight.
==[will not]==
途有所不由，軍有所不擊，城有所不攻，地有所不爭，君
有所不受。
There are roads that one will not go down, armies that
one will not attack, city walls that one will not
besiege, areas for which one will not struggle, and
commands of sovereigns that one will not accept.
==[General]==
故
Truly,
將通於九變之利者，知用兵矣﹔
the general who is totally conversant regarding the
benefits of the nine classes of permutations is one
who knows how to use soldiers.
將不通九變之利，雖知地形，不能得地之利矣﹔
The general who is not totally conversant regarding
the benefits of the nine classes of permutations will
not be able to take advantage of the terrain even
though he may know its contours.
治兵不知九變之術，雖知地利，不能得人之用矣。
If those who regulate troops are not totally
conversant regarding the techniques pertaining to the
nine classes of permutations, then even though they
know the advantages offered by the land, they will be
unable to secure the utility of human beings.
是故智者之慮，必雜於利害。
So the assessments of those who are knowledgeable must
take cognizance of both benefits and liabilities.
雜於利，而務可信也﹔
To the extent that their cogitations are influenced by
considerations of benefit, they may be able to keep
faith in regard to their responsibilities.
雜於害，而患可解也。
To the extent that their cogitations are influenced by
considerations of liabilities, it will be possible to
extricate themselves from suffering.
是故屈諸侯者以害，役諸侯者以業，趨諸侯者以利。
For this reason, the [resistance of the] nobles is
crumpled by subjecting them to injuries. They are
enslaved by subjecting them to tasks. They are herded
by providing them with benefits.
{{PEM: How does one best handle a wild horse? Does one
break its will or does one gain its trust?}}
故用兵之法，
So the method of using soldiers [is as follows]:
無恃其不來，恃吾有以待也﹔
Do not depend on [the opposition's] not coming,
depend, instead, on having something to meet them
with.
無恃其不攻，恃吾有所不可攻也。
Do not depend of their not attacking. Depend, instead,
on one's own invincibility.
==[five perils]==
故將有五危﹕
Truly, generals face five perils:
必死可殺 ﹔必生可虜﹔ 忿速可侮﹔ 廉潔可辱﹔愛民可煩。
Daredevils can get themselves killed.
The overly cautious can get captured.
Plunging ahead can lead them to insults.
Moral fastidiousness can lead them to disgrace.
Being too sparing of the people can result in
vexations.
凡此五者，將之過也，用兵之災也。覆軍殺將，必以五危，不可不察也。
The above five items are the transgressions that
generals make, and the cause of disasters in the use
of troops. The reason for armies to be put to rout and
for generals to be killed must be found among those
five factors, and one cannot fail to take cognizance
of them.
<9>《孫子兵法》第九篇 行軍
Master Sun's Art of War. Ninth Chapter
Moving Troops
孫子曰﹕
Master Sun says:
凡處軍﹑相敵，
In all cases of deploying troops to respond to an
enemy:
絕山依谷，
Cut [through] the mountains by depending [on the
intervening] valleys.
視生處高，戰隆無登，
To keep a watch for signs of life, take a high
position, but when battle is at its strongest do not
head upwards,
此處山上之軍也。
This is the way to deploy troops in the mountains.
==[water]==
絕水必遠水﹔
If you have cut through a river, get away from it
promptly.
客絕水而來，勿迎於水內，
Don't meet the enemy in the water.
令半濟而擊之，利﹔
It is better to let him get half way across.
欲戰者，無附於水而迎客﹔
If you want to fight, do not stick close to the water
to meet them.
視生處高，無迎水流 ；
To look for signs of life find a natural crow's nest;
do not meet them in the flowing stream.
此處水上之軍也。
These are the ways of dealing with military encounters
on the water.
==[low lands]==
絕斥澤，
To cross through a swamp or a marsh
惟亟去無留﹔
the only way is to go rapidly and not stick around.
若交軍於斥澤之中，必依水草，而背眾樹，此處斥澤之軍也。
If one crosses paths with an opposing army in a swamp
or marsh, one must depend on water vegetation and put
massed trees at one's back. This is the way to deploy
troops in swamps and marshland.
==[flat lands]==
平陸處易，右背高，前死後生，此處平陸之軍也。
It is easy to deploy troops on level land.
The right [flank should be kept] to the rear and
higher. Keep any fatal land ahead and safer land
behind.
This is the way to deploy troops on level land.
{{PEM: The way forth (toward enemy troops) promises
death, and the path rearward (away from approaching
troops) promises life.}}
凡此四軍之利，黃帝之所以勝四帝也。
The military benefits of these four are that by which
the Yellow Emperor overcame the four emperors.
==[]==
凡軍好高而惡下，貴陽而賤陰，養生而處實，軍無百疾，是謂必勝。
All armies favor the high ground and hate to occupy
positions lower [than the enemy]. They value the sunny
and despise the dark and shady. They nourish life and
take their positions in positions offering them
resources. For the army not to be faced with the
hundred ailments is regarded as a "must win" status.
丘陵隄防，必處其陽，而右背之。此兵之利，地之助也。
In the case of hills and embankments, one must take
one's position on their sunward side, and keep the
higher ground to one's back and right side, for this
is beneficial to the troops and gives them the aid of
the terrain.
上雨水沫至，欲涉者，待其定也。
When rains increase and the foaming waters threaten,
even if one desires to get across, one must wait until
such time as the waters stabilize.
{{PEM: These conditions predict a flash flood.}}
凡地有
In all cases where lands have
絕澗﹑天井﹑天牢﹑天羅﹑天陷﹑天隙，必亟去之，勿近也。
dividing mountain streams, natural wells, natural
pens, natural nets, natural pitfalls, natural fissures
-- do not approach.
In all lands that have places where they are cut off
by streams and rivers,
吾遠之，敵近之﹔吾迎之，敵背之。
If I keep my distance from them and the enemy
approaches, then I can approach them while the enemy
has his back to them.
軍旁有險阻﹑潢井﹑蒹葭﹑林木﹑翳薈者，必謹覆索之，此伏奸之所也。
Whenever one's army flank is in the vicinity of rugged
obstructions, ponds and wells, reeds and bullrushes,
forests and groves, or screening undergrowth, one must
double one's attempts to surveil them because these
are the places where enemy elements will hide
out.
==[on the lookout]==
近而靜者，恃其險也﹔.遠而挑戰者，欲人之進也﹔其所居易者，利也。
When the enemy is near and remaining silent, they
depend on the ruggedness of the terrain. When the
enemy is far and challenging us to war, they desire us
to approach their easily defended position. Places
where the enemy takes up exposed positions is an
offered bait.
==[signs]==
眾樹動者，來也﹔ 眾草多障者，疑也﹔
When there are movements in many trees, it is [a sign
of] approaching [enemy troops]. When one is obstructed
by heavy growths of vegetation, one must be filled
with trepidation.
鳥起者，伏也 ﹔獸駭者，覆也﹔
When birds are flushed it is because people are
concealing themselves. When animals are bounding away,
it is because of people under cover [starting to move
in on us].
塵高而銳者，車來也﹔ 卑而廣者，徒來也﹔
If dust rises high in a narrow cloud, that signals the
arrival of chariots. If [the dust] forms a low and
wide cloud, that signals the arrival of foot soldiers.
散而條達者，樵採也﹔ 少而往來者，營軍也。
If dust clouds are dispersed and form separate tracks,
that signals their foraging for wood. If dust clouds
are minor and come and go, that signals the encampment
of troops.
==[signs of incipient action]==
辭卑而益備者，進也﹔ 辭詭而強進驅者，退也﹔
If one's enemy's words are humble and give benefit to
[his growing] preparedness, his intention is to
advance. If their words are full of sophistries and
indicate the intent to drive in by force, they will
[in fact] retreat.
輕車先出其側者，陣也；
If light vehicles first deploy from the sides of their
column to take up flanking positions, that signals
troop deployments [forward].
無約而請和者，謀也﹔
Those who request harmony without demanding any
preconditions or guarantees by treaty are plotters.
{{PEM: In a realistic situation one would expect the
opposition to impose conditions and/or seek
guarantees. Not doing so indicates that the opponent
has never anticipated the agreement running its
normal course.}}
奔走而陳兵者，期也﹔ 半進半退者，誘也。
When troops are rushing forward and taking determinate
positions, that is an indiction of a definite plan.
When troops seem to advance for a while and then seem
to be retreating, that is an attempt to tempt their
opposition [into an ambush or an unplanned attack,
seeing them milling around].
杖而立者，飢也﹔ 汲而先飲者，渴也﹔
Troops that need to support themselves on staffs or
canes are starving. Those who drink immediately upon
drawing water are parched with thirst.
見利而不知進者，勞也﹔
Those who perceive benefit and yet fail to advance
toward it are exhausted.
鳥集者，虛也 夜呼者，恐也﹔
Birds flock to places where there is a void.
Those who cry out in the night are afraid.
軍擾者，將不重也﹔
If the troops are distraught or turbulent, their
general lacks gravitas.
旌旗動者，亂也 ﹔吏怒者，倦也﹔
If their flags dip and bob around, that is an
indication of chaos among the troops.
If their non-coms act indignant, the troops are
fatigued.
殺馬肉食，軍無糧也； 懸甑不返其舍者，窮寇也﹔
If their troops are killing their horses and eating
their meat, the troops are without provisions.
If the caldrons are not put away after use, they are
nothing but impoverished bandits.
{{PEM: Such treatment of ordinary implements of group
life indicates an extreme lack of military
discipline.}}
諄諄翕翕，徐與人言者，失眾也﹔ 數賞者，窘也﹔
Those [generals] who are constantly being agreeable
and speak gently to people have lost command of the
masses.
數罰者，困也 ﹔
Those who repeatedly punish their subordinates are in
a jam.
先暴而後畏其眾者，不精之至也﹔
Those who first lose their tempers and afterwards
stand in fear of their masses have reached this pass
as a result of being far less than proficient.
來委謝者，欲休息也。
When individuals come offering insincere
blandishments, they [actually] desire a rest.
兵怒而相迎，久而不合，又不相去，必謹察之。
When soldiers become angry and clash, and then for a
long time they remain disunited, yet they do not
actually break contact, one must carefully investigate
this matter.
{{PEM: Apparently Master Sun's experience has taught
him that there could be many different causes for this
kind of situation.}}
兵非貴益多也，惟無武進，足以並力﹑ 料敵﹑ 取人而已。
Troops are not concerned about the enemy's
augmentation of its troop forces. It is sufficient
only that there will be no military advance.
It is sufficient to establish parity, understand the
enemy, and take them.
夫惟無慮而易敵者，必擒於人。
Now it is only those who do not take thought and who
underestimate the enemy who inevitably will be taken
captive by others.
==[]==
卒未親附而罰之，則不服，
If foot soldiers have not bonded yet and you punish
them, then they will not submit to you [willingly].
不服則難用。
If they do not submit to you willingly, then it will
be difficult to get anything out of them.
卒已親附而罰不行，則不可用也。
If troops have already bonded and their superiors do
not use punishments [when merited] then those are
troops that cannot be employed.
{{PEM: Those who fail to follow orders are hard to put
to any good use. The soldier who receives supervision
and training and yet does not perform properly is
someone who cannot be employed.}}
故令之以文，齊之以武，是謂必取。
So command by the ornaments of culture and even out
the rough spots by military discipline and then one
may take [effective control
of them].
令素行以教其民，則民服令素。不行以教其民，則民不服。
When those in command have chaste personal deportment
and by that means teach their people, then the people
will be obedient.
When those in command do not teach their people by the
means of their own chaste personal deportment, then
the people will not be obedient.
令素行者，與眾相得也。
Those who have chaste personal deportment and the
multitudes with whom they interact both gain.
<10>《孫子兵法》第十篇 地形
Master Sun's Art of War. Tenth Chapter
Terrain
孫子曰﹕
Master Sun said:
地形有通者﹑
The varieties of terrains include (1) communicating, (accessible)
有掛者﹑
(2) hooked, hanging suspended (entrapping)
有支者﹑
(3) branching, deadlocked, stymied
有隘者﹑
(4) confined
有險者﹑
(5) rugged, dangerous, precipitous and
有遠者。
(6) remote [from one's own encampment or sphere of influence]
==[descriptions of the above 6]==
我可以往，彼可以來，曰通。
When I can move forward, and the other side can come
to me, that is called "communicating." (accessible)
通形者，先居高陽，利糧道，以戰則利。
As for communicating landforms, if one first takes up
a position in the high lands and in the sun , and
takes advantage of supply lines, then that will be
advantageous in warfare.
可以往，難以返，曰掛。掛形者，敵無備，出而勝之，
When I can move forward, but it is difficult to move
back, that is called "barbed." In landforms of this
"barbed" variety,
敵若有備，出而不勝，則難以返，不利。
if the enemy is not completely prepared and one goes
forward one will overcome them. If the enemy is
completely prepared and then one goes out and does not
win, then it will be difficult to
retreat, and that is not advantageous.
我出而不利，彼出而不利，曰支。
When it will not be advantageous for me to go (out =)
forward, and it will not be advantageous for the
opposition to go out, then that is called "stymied."
支形者，敵雖利我，我無出也，引而去之，
令敵半出而擊之，利。
Landforms of this "stymied" nature are such that even
if the enemy offers me an advantage I will not go
forth. I will pull back and depart from the enemy,
causing the enemy to partially come out and then I
will attack him to my advantage.
隘形者，我先居之，必盈以待敵。若敵先居之，盈而勿從，
不盈而從之。
With landforms that are confined, if I first occupy
such a position, then I must fully invest my position
and await the arrival of my enemy. If the enemy first
occupies such a position and fully invests it, then I
must not follow on to attack. Only if he fails
to fully invest his position can I then follow on to
attack.
險形者，我先居之，必居高陽以待敵﹔若敵先居之，
引而去之，勿從也。
With landforms that are rugged/precipitous, should I
first occupy them, then I must take up a position high
and on the sunny side to await the advance of the
enemy. Should the enemy get there first, then I will
seek to "pull" him by going away, and will not follow
him [into the rugged terrain].
遠形者，勢均，難以挑戰，戰而不利。
With landforms that are remote, if forces are equal
then it is difficult to provoke the enemy to battle,
and even if there is a battle it will not be to our
advantage.
凡此六者，地之道也，將之至任，不可不察也。
All of these six involve the way of terrain, and the
highest responsibilities of the general, and they must
be carefully investigated.
==[failure factors]==
故兵有走者﹑有弛者﹑有陷者﹑有崩者﹑有亂者﹑有北者。
Truly, [problematical] troops include those who have
been routed, those who are lax or insubordinate, those
who fallen into pitfalls, those who have been toppled,
those who are in disorder, and those who mutiny.
凡此六者，非天地之災，將之過也。
All of these six cases are not natural disasters but
the mistakes of their generals.
==[6]==
夫勢均，以一擊十，曰走。
Now if forces are equal but the general directs one to
attack ten, then this portends a rout.
卒強吏弱，曰弛。
If the foot soldiers are strong but their officers are
weak, this portends laxity or insubordination.
吏強卒弱，曰陷。
If the officers are strong but their troops are weak,
this means falling into a pitfall.
{{PEM: The pitfall is that the men are physically
exhausted, but not their officers, and why is that?
Because of failures of command.}}
大吏怒而不服，遇敵懟而自戰，將不知其能，曰崩。
If the upper echelon officers are angry and not
obedient, and when they encounter the enemy they
express their hatred by making an attack entirely on
their own, and the general does not know that
they are capable of this kind of behavior, that
portends getting crushed."
將懦不嚴，教導不明，吏卒無常，陳兵縱橫，曰亂。
If the general is weak and is not strict, and if his
leadership is not eminent, then there will not be a
normal relationship between the non-coms and the foot
soldiers, and the formations of troops will be sloppy
and unruly. That is called disorder.
將不能料敵，以少合眾，以弱擊強，兵無選鋒，曰北。
If the general is unable to fathom the enemy, if he
uses small numbers of troops to come to grips with
multitudes of troops, if he uses weakness to attack
the strong, and the troops do not have a designated
probing point, this portends rout or mutiny.
{{PEM: Literally, the text speaks of these troops not
having a "choosing point" or a "selecting group on
point." The only way for a large group to be effective
against a numerically superior force would be for
small detachments to repeatedly probe the perimeter of
the larger force until a weak point could be found.
An indiscriminate attack against superior forces would
result in heavy losses for no benefit, and the
soldiers would revolt against their lives being
wasted.}}
凡此六者，敗之道也，將之至任，不可不察也。
All six cases are the ways that lead to defeat. These
are matters that are pertinent to the highest
responsibility of a general, and they must be given
adequate attention and study.
==[ ]==
夫地形者，兵之助也。料敵制勝，計險阨遠近，上將之道。
Now the lay of the land [should be] an aid to the
troops. Understanding the enemy makes for victory.
Taking measure of the rugged and the smooth passage,
the far and the near, is the way of the best general.
知此而用戰者必勝﹔不知此而用戰者必敗。
If, knowing this, one uses warfare, then one must win.
If one does not know this and uses warfare, then one
must lose.
Truly,
戰道必勝，主曰無戰，必戰可也﹔
if by the principles of warfare one must win yet the
sovereign says not to go to war, then in case warfare
becomes unavoidable one may do battle.
戰道不勝，主曰必戰，無戰可也。
If according to the principles of warfare one will not
win and yet the sovereign says that one must go to
war, it is permissible not to do battle.
故((進不求名，退不避罪，
惟民是保，而利於主))，國之寶也。
So advance without seeking fame, retreat without
trying to escape blame. heeding only that the people
are to be protected, then that will be of benefit to
the sovereign and one will be a treasure to the
nation.
視卒如嬰兒，故可以與之赴深谿﹔ 視卒如愛子，故可與之俱死。
View the common soldiers as though they were infants,
and only then one can order them to enter into a
chasm. View the common soldiers as though they were
your own beloved sons, and only then you can you send
them all to their deaths.
{{PEM: The point is that the general can never fail to
have the highest level of concern for his own troops.
He will send them into great danger only if the
gravity of the situation is such that he would require
his own children to face those dangers.}}
厚而不能使，
If a soldier is so personally loyal that he cannot be
given any duties, or
愛而不能令，
if a soldier is so beloved that he cannot be
commanded, or
亂而不能治，
If a soldier is so disorderly that he cannot be
corrected,
譬若驕子，不可用也。
then he is comparable to a spoiled child and may not
be employed.
{{PEM: This is really a comment on the personal
failings of a leader who plays favorites with his
subordinates, has a subjective attitude with regard to
his subordinates, etc.}}
==[Evaluation of both sides]==
知吾卒之可以擊，而不知敵之不可擊，勝之半也﹔
To know that one's own troops can strike yet not know
that the enemy troops cannot strike is only halfway to
victory.
知敵之可擊，而不知吾卒之不可擊，勝之半也﹔
To know that the enemy troops can strike yet not know
that one's own troops cannot strike, is only halfway
to victory.
知敵之可擊，知吾卒之可以擊，而不知地形之不可以戰，勝之半也。
To know that the enemy can be struck, and know that
one's own troops can strike, yet not know under that
conditions of terrain are such that one cannot engage
in battle, is only halfway to victory.
故知兵者，動而不迷，舉而不窮。
So those who really know soldiering will move and not
get lost, and will take action without running out of
things to do.
故曰﹕知己知彼，勝乃不殆﹔ 知天知地，勝乃可全。
So it is said: by knowing oneself and knowing one's
counterpart, victory will not be in question. By
knowing the [factors of ] heaven and earth, one's
victory can be complete.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
<11>《孫子兵法》第十一篇 九地
Master Sun's Art of War. Eleventh Chapter
The Nine Terrains
孫子曰﹕
Master Sun said:
凡用兵之法，
有散地，
There are positions that are unconsolidated
有輕地，
There are positions that are lightly held
有爭地，
There are positions that are under contest {{(Porkchop
hill)}}
有交地，
There are positions that are interconnected
有衢地，
There are positions on a concourse {{-- think of
Khyber Pass}}
有重地，
There are crucial positions
有圮地，
There are positions that injurious ((harrowing?))
有圍地，
There are positions that are surrounded
有死地。
There are positions that are deadly
==[characterizations]==
諸侯自戰其地者，為散地。
When the nobles fight among themselves in their own
lands, they are called unconsolidated lands.
入人之地不深者，為輕地。
When one has made shallow incursions into the lands of
others, those lands are called light(ly held) lands.
我得則利，彼得亦利者，為爭地。
When some land would be beneficial for me to obtain
and also beneficial to other should they obtain it,
that is called a contested land.
我可以往，彼可以來者，為交地。
Lands into which I can move, and into which others can
also come are called interconnecting lands.
諸侯之地三屬，先至而得天下之眾者，為衢地。
Lands of the nobility are grouped into three kinds:
Some lands are such that if one gets there first one
will acquire the [allegiance of the] multitudes of all
under heaven, and these lands are called concourses.
入人之地深，背城邑多者，為重地。
When one has made deep incursions into some land and
is then backed up by many [unconquered] city walls and
principalities, those places are called crucial lands.
山林﹑險阻﹑沮澤，凡難行之道者，為圮地。
All lands that are hard to travel through on account
of mountains and forests, rugged obstructions//
ravines&defiles//, marshes and swamps, and all places
hard to travel through are called injurious
((harrowing?)) lands.
所從由入者隘，所從歸者迂，彼寡可以擊我之眾者，為圍地。
Those places that have narrow access corridors, and
are hard to get back out of, so that the other side
can use a small number of troops to attack multitudes
of my own troops are called surrounded lands.
疾戰則存，不疾戰則亡者，為死地。
When [only] by frenzied warfare can one secure
survival, but by less active warfare one will perish,
those positions are called deadly.
是故散地則無戰，輕地則無止，爭地則無攻，交地則無絕，衢地則合交，
For those reasons, in unconsolidated lands one will
not fight wars, in lightly held lands one will not
tarry, in contested lands one will not make aggressive
actions, in concourse lands one will not permit
oneself to be cut off, and in the corridor areas one
will come together and interact//form alliances w.
nearby feudal lords//.
{{PEM:Later on there are passages where some say Master Sun
forbids the making of any alliances. Obviously this
passages casts doubt on those interpretations.}}
重地則掠，圮地則行，圍地則謀，死地則戰。
In the crucial lands one will plunder, in lands that
are injurious ((harrowing?)) one will keep moving, in
lands susceptible to ambush one will keep up a screen
of deceptions, and in the deadly areas one will fight.
==[]==
所謂古之善用兵者，能使敵人前後不相及，眾寡不相恃，
貴賤不相救，上下不相收，卒離而不集，兵合而不齊。
In antiquity, those who were good at the use of troops
would cause their enemies to be unable to keep
connection between their vanguards and their trailing
elements, and make it so that their heavily populated
areas and their lightly populated areas could not
depend on each other, their nobility and their common
folk could not save each other, their upper and lower
classes could not accept each other, their soldiers
separated and unable to flock together, and so that
even if their troops were brought together they could
not be deployed/maintained in a regular (smooth) way.
合於利而動，不合於利而止。
When groups come together over mutual benefits then
they will go into action. Otherwise, they will grind
to a halt.
敢問﹕「敵眾整而將來，待之若何﹖」
I dare to ask, "When the multitudes of enemy troops
are well ordered and about to come on the scene, how
should they be treated?"
曰﹕「先奪其所愛，則聽矣」
[The master] said: "First snatch away what they love,
and then they will obey you ."
==[]==
兵之情主速，
Speed is the master of the emotions of soldiers.
乘人之不及,
Take advantage of times when one's counterparts have
not yet come upon the scene.
由不虞之道，攻其所不戒也。
Come by unexpected pathways and attack them where they
have not been warned.
凡為客之道﹕深入則專，主人不克。掠於饒野，三軍足食。
In all cases wherein one moves deeply into the
territory of others, then one's troops are
single minded, and as a result masters of
those lands cannot overcome you. Take plunder only in
fertile regions, and the three armies will get enough
to eat.
謹養勿勞，並氣積力，運兵計謀，為不可測。
Use cautious nurture and do not toil the soldiers
[overmuch]. Redouble their qi and store up their
energies. When moving troops use calculation and
deception in such a way that you cannot be predicted.
投之無所往，死且不北，死焉不得，士人盡力。
Impel them forward so that they will have no alternate
destination, and in that way they may die without
opposing their orders. In order that they will not
secure their own deaths, the officers and men will
exhaust all their energies.
兵士甚陷則不懼，
When troops and officers are put in unavoidable
conflict they will not suffer trepidation.
無所往則固，
When there is no place left to go they will be
steadfast.
入深則拘，
When they are in deep then they will stick to it.
不得已則鬥。
When there is nothing they can do about it, when there
is no real alternative, then they will fight.
是故其兵不修而戒，不求而得，不約而親，不令而信。
So his troops will be cautious without the need for
being pruned back. Their [fidelity] will be obtained
without its being solicited. They will stay close by
their leader without any contracts being demanded of
them. They will be faithful/trustworthy without
being so commanded.
禁祥去疑，至死無所之。
Forbid omen taking and so get rid of [causes for]
doubts, and they will have nowhere else to go even if
threatened with death.
==[]==
吾士無餘財，非惡貨也﹔.無餘命，非惡壽也。
My officers have no excess of property. It is not that
they despise goods. They have no great lifespan. It is
not that they despise longevity.
令發之日，士卒坐者涕霑襟，偃臥者涕交頤。
On the day that they are commanded to set forth, both
the officers and the troops will soak their tunics if
they are sitting or their tears will flood their
cheeks if lying down.
投之無所往，則諸劌之勇也。
But throw them into situations where they have no
choice and they will exhibit the bravery of Zhuan Zhe
or Cao Gui (two exemplary heroes).
==[snake]==
故善用兵者，譬如率然。
Truly, those who are good at using troops are
exemplified by the Shuai Ran.
率然者，常山之蛇也。
The Shuai Ran is the snake of Chang Mountain. //check
name//
擊其首則尾至，擊其尾則首至，擊其中則首尾俱至。
If you attack its head then its tail will get you. If
you attack its tail then its head will get you. And if
you attack it in the middle then both ends will get
you.
敢問﹕「兵可使如率然乎﹖」
May I ask: "Is it possible to make troops be like
Shuai Ran?"
曰﹕「可」。夫吳人與越人相惡也，當其同舟共濟而遇風，其相救也，
如左右手。
Answer: Yes. Now the people of Wu and the people of
Yue hate each other. But should they share the same
boat to attempt a crossing and encounter a wind storm
then they will attempt to save each other and they
must serve each other as left hand and right hand.
==[]==
是故方馬埋輪，未足恃也。
Truly, even though horses be hobbled and chariots have
their wheels buried it provides nothing to depend on.
{{PEM: If you fetter horses and disable chariots could
the troops still not flee?}}
齊勇如一，政之道也，
Regularity their bravery so that it is entirely equal
[among all your troops], and that is the way to secure
good (governance =) control.
{{PEM: This part sounds very cynical, as do the parts
that talk about moving troops without giving them any
idea of where they are going. But if the troops do not
know where they are going ahead of time then there is
no way for that information to be secured by enemy
spies. Similarly, if the army is going to have to
fight anyway, then it is important to keep it united.
If desertion occurs, the fleeing troops will likely be
picked off one by one, and those who remain loyal are
then at greater risk. From an entirely utilitarian
point of view, it is not in the general's interest to
unnecessarily lose even a single soldier. It is his
responsibility to see the best way to maintain group
cohesion, conformity to the strategy, and a fighting
morale. How he does this may depend on the level of
discipline of the troops he has on hand. A well
trained army might see the need to follow orders and
for some units to take on hard duties from time to
time. A green army might require some degree of
manipulation to avoid its falling apart
psychologically and getting wiped out as a result.}}
剛柔皆得，地之理也。
[When] both hard/firm and soft/supple are
(attained =) present, this is the pattern/topography
of the land.
{{PEM: Does he mean that a yielding response to enemy
incursion or a more rigid response is rightfully
determined by the topography or other features of the
land? One can afford to put up strong resistance if
one has a natural fortress to rely upon. If one is in
a disadvantageous situation where one is somehow
exposed to a high level of danger and threat, then it
may be better to bluff and fade, or "da da tan
tan" (fight for a while and then negotiate for a
while) as Mao Zedong advised.
{{The other pair like this mentioned earlier are 奇正,
the upright and the deceptive. Then, with regard to
the rigid and the supple, there are differences in the
ways that troops can act on the battlefield (or in
one-to-one combat. things such as fade and riposte.
故善用兵者，攜手若使一人，不得已也。
So those who are good at employing troops are linked
to them as though to a single person -- unstoppable!
{{PEM: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fingerspitzengef%C3%BChl Fingerspizengefühl]. A general who is connected
to his troops just as the mind is connected to all the
parts of the body will, through them, have awareness
not only of the lay of the land but also of all that
passes through that land, all that threatens his
troops, etc.}}
{{PEM: There has to be a connection between the last 2
sentences. If you know the lay of the land perfectly,
and if you can get reports from your troops on a
fairly dependable basis, then you may achieve
fingerspizengefühl.}}
==[]==
將軍之事﹕靜以幽，正以治。
The tasks of a general are to achieve tranquility by
use of the hidden, and to achieve uprightness by the
use of repairative efforts. Or maybe it is supposed to
be: The tasks of a general are to be tranquil in order
to become hidden, and to use uprightness in order to
regulate things.
{{PEM: Earlier the general was required to not be
subjective in his treatment of individual soldiers or
groups of soldiers. Here he is advised in how to
maintain this objective frame of mind.
or
The ordinary expectation of a general is to be
"commanding," etc. But here Master Sun advises
tranquility and uprightness -- which are moral virtues
(associated with Daoism and Confucianism
respectively). }}
能愚士卒之耳目，使之無知。
The general is able to stupefy the eyes and ears of
the officers and troops and make them unknowing.
{{PEM: See the above discussion. The point is that it
is the general's job to maintain overall control.
Sometimes it is necessary to put one's hand into the
fire to keep the bomb from blowing up. The hand does
not know it, but the brain does.}}
易其事，革其謀，使人無識。
The general is able to change the things that he does,
to alter radically his plans, and to keep people in
the dark.
{{PEM: Fearing spies, and/or fearing that troops will
lose heart and spook.}}
易其居，迂其途，使人不得慮。
The general is able to change their camps, and to make
convoluted their marches, thereby causing them to keep
other people from being able to figure him out.
{{PEM: The motivations I argue for above are more
clearly disclosed here.}}
帥與之期，如登高而去其梯。
The leader gives them a predetermined course of
action, as though leading them to a high place and
then removing their ladder.
{{PEM: The translation is unclear. The image is clear.
The general sends his troops into a certain situation,
the dangers of which (and the advantages of which) may
not be known by the soldiers. It is their job to
follow orders, and then even though some of them
might be wavering, when the trigger is pulled they no
longer have the option of wavering because they are in
a hot fight. If the general has done his job, he is
springing one part of a trap or other operation. His
next move may be to order the same unit to retreat,
and in retreating they will draw the enemy between
ambuscades set up on both sides of the escape route,
but it will not be safe to disclose this intention to
anybody.}}
帥與之深入諸侯之地，而發其機，焚舟破釜，若驅群羊。驅而往，
驅而來，莫知所之。
The leader has them make deep entries into the
territories of the feudal lords and then pulls the
trigger, firing boats and crushing caldrons as though
driving a flock of sheep. Where they are driven
they will go, and none know where they will end up.
{{PEM: I think there was something done like this in a
British invasion of France long ago.}}
==[]==
聚三軍之眾，投之於 險，此將軍之事也。
When one assembles the masses of the Three Armies, and
throws them into the "badlands," this is the act of a
general.
{{PEM: In response to some kind of invasion or
assault, an independent group of defenders might make
some aggressive move on their opponents, but it is
doubtful that they would know when to continue an
assault despite seeming difficulties, or call a
strategic retreat despite seeming to have the enemy on
the run. Going into a very dangerous situation has to
be the reasoned tactic of a general.}}
九地之變，屈伸之利，人情之理，不可不察也。
The transformations of the nine kinds of lands and the
benefits of scrunching together or stretching out
(defensive and offensive postures), the patterns of
the feelings of men, must all be given adequate
investigation.
凡為客之道﹕深則專，淺則散。
The ways for being an interloper upon the lands of
others: If one's entry is deep, everyone will be
together. If one's entry is shallow, then everyone
fans out.
{{PEM: Fanning out can both be a function of there
being neither an effective defense against movement in
any direction, nor discovery of anything in particular
to take as one's objective.}}
去國越境而師者，絕地也﹔
When one leaves one's own country and crosses over the
borders of other while acting as an army, that is to
sever a land (i.e., to sever one's connection with
home).
四達者，衢地也﹔
When there is easy access in all four directions, one
is in a "concourse" land.
入深者，重地也﹔
When the entry is perforce deep, that is a crucial
land.
/////////////
Check agreement of the translations of these terms
//////////////////
入淺者，輕地也﹔
When one's entry is perforce shallow, that is a
negligible land.
背固前隘者，圍地也﹔
When one's backing ground is obdurate and one's
foreground territory offers only narrow and
constrained pathways, one is in a surrounded area.
無所往者，死地也。
When one is in a place where one has nowhere left to
go, that is a deadly zone.
是故
For that reason,
散地，吾將一其志﹔
In a dispersed territory, I must then unify their
aspirations.
{{PEM: There is nothing in the situation to keep the
troops together. They will tend to fan out. So the
general has to exert control and give them a common
goal. (Remember Dao/Way.)}}
輕地，吾將使之屬﹔
In a negligible territory, I must then cause them to
come under strict control.
{{Being under no discernible pressure they are likely
to kiss everything off.}}
爭地，吾將趨其後﹔
In a contested territory, I must rapidly advance the
rear [wagons].
{{PEM: The supply wagons, being heavier and pulled by
draft animals, will tend to plod along. But under
these circumstances they will easily get too far from
the vanguard and the main body of troops to be
protected unless attention is paid to keeping
everybody together.}}
交地，吾將謹其守﹔
In a territory that is well interlaced with
connections to other territories, I must make careful
defenses to hold it.
{{PEM: Even if there is no enemy in sight, the nature
of the terrain means that originally distant
opposition forces could arrive on the scene rapidly.
So defenses have to be already in place in expectation
of that eventuality.}}
衢地，吾將固其結﹔
In a territory that is a concourse for the world, I
must consolidate my nodes.//knots as in "tie the
knot," i.e., solemnized connections w/ other nations.
{{PEM: In these situations it is already known that
there are many actors already on the stage. So they
have to be contacted and deals worked out with them
whenever possible. At the very minimum one must
ascertain what they are all up to.}}
重地，吾將繼其食﹔
In a crucial territory, I must take care to maintain
our supply lines and provisions.
{{PEM: Not only is it easier to get cut off, but it is
likely to be harder to provision oneself locally.}}
圮地，吾將進其途﹔
As for devastated territories, I must make [rapid]
inroads.
{{PEM: Local resources are severely limited, and there
is nothing in particular to be gained there, so get
through these areas as soon as possible.}}
圍地，吾將塞其闕﹔
As for areas that are surrounded, I will stuff any
loopholes.
{{PEM: This part is ambiguous. If I am surrounded,
then I have to maintain a defensive perimeter and not
permit any weak points or loopholes. If I am
surrounding someone else then I will not want that
army to be able to move in any direction except those
that I choose for it.}}
死地，吾將示之以不活。
And as for the deadly zones, I will make it clear to
[the opposition] that we will fight to the death.
{{PEM: As the old holy man told the bedraggled cobra,
"I did not tell you not to hiss."}}
故兵之情﹕圍則禦，不得已則鬥，逼則從。
So, the feelings of soldiers are such that if they are
surrounded they will defend themselves; if they have
no choice then they will struggle, and if they are
pushed to it then they will follow [their leaders}}.
{{PEM: If the soldiers perceive (accurately) that
their general has their best chance for survival in
mind, then they are going to be well motivated to
follow his directions.}}
==[]==
是故不知諸侯之謀者，不能預交。
For those reasons, if one does not know about the
plans and consultations among the [outsider] nobility,
then one will not be able to make preparatory
alliances.
{{PEM: Just what I said above.}}
{{PEM: Still with the "concourse" situation I think.
With multiple players it obviously will not work to
try to make separate deals with two groups that are
unfriendly to each other.}}
不知山林﹑險阻﹑沮澤之形者，不能行軍。
If one does not know the contours of mountains and
forests, of rugged and obstructed territories, of
swamps and marshes, then one will not be able to put
the military into operation.
{{PEM: True in itself, but also an analogy for the
previous kind of situation.}}
不用鄉導者，不能得地利。
If one does not use local guides, then one will not
get the advantages of the terrain.
四五者，不知一，非霸王之兵也。
Those who fail to know one of these several things,
are then not the soldiers of a true king.
夫霸王之兵，伐大國，則其眾不得聚，威加於敵，則其交不得合。
Now the soldiers of a true king, should they attack a
great country, then the masses {{of the other country]
will not get a chance to gather together, and so their
clashing with the invaders will not be a unified
action.
Giles:
When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state,
his generalship shows itself in preventing the
concentration of the enemy's forces. He overawes his
opponents, and their allies are prevented from
joining against him.
{{Major point 2}}
是故不爭天下之交，不養天下之權，信己之私，威加於敵，<則>[故]其城可拔，
其國可墜。
{{PEM: Most translations of this passage are in agreement
with the early Giles translation:
"Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all
and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other
states. He carries out his own secret designs, keeping
his antagonists in awe. Thus he is able to capture
their cities and overthrow their kingdoms."
{{This interpretation ignores Master Sun's frequent
injunctions to engage diplomatically with all states
pertinent to any potential conflict situation. At the
bare minimum, failure to have a diplomatic presence in
other countries would close off an obvious and useful
source of intelligence. Second, having a diplomatic
channel of communication would make it possible to bargain
with parties standing outside of any one-to-one conflict
that one's own nation might find itself in. Third, Master
Sun in other places advocates active interation with other
states in ways that would obviate the necessity to expend
one's own troops and treasure. Armed conflict is to be the
last resort. It is better to threaten an attack
convincingly than to have to actually fight. It is better
to have other nations in a cooperative mode with regard to
one's own nation than to have to compel them by threats.
Moreover, if one would like to incorporate two or more
nations into one it would be better to do so on the
grounds of mutual interests rather than having to garrison
a reluctant and potentially break-away part of a new
nation formed on the basis of conquest.
{{The early Zhou dynasty rulers were faced with a
situation in which they had taken over a vast territory
previously governed by the Shang dynasty. Their successes
were due to their being able to give their new holdings a
Dao -- the idea of a benificent rule imposed by the
Mandate of Heaven. Their first challenges came about
because they permitted a remnant of the former dynasty to
stay in control of its own state -- from which it fomented
rebellion.
{{PEM: The Giles translation of this brief passage is,
moreover, not precise. It is somewhat distorted in each
part because the general idea is off.}}
是故不爭天下之交，
For this reason, [if] X does not (struggle =) actively
interact in all diplomatic channels in the world,
不養天下之權，
[if] X does not nurture power balances in all under
heaven,
{{PEM: It would be possible to regard this passage as
speaking of the power of any or all other nations, or
as speaking of one's own power to act against all other
nations, but realistically speaking power balances can
only be managed by paying attention to all powers that
interact among themselves.}}
信己之私，
[if] X believes or puts trust in X's own personal
[things],
{{Giles thinks this passage refers to the "secret designs"
of Master Sun or his ruler. And he gives 信 an
interpretation that it does not have in any other passage
that uses it in this book. But if it means "belief" or
"trust" here, as it does in the rest of the book, then
the passage still can be given a consistent
interpretation.
{{The "personal" things are not specified, but the word
私 xin normally connotes something not only personal but
self-centered, selfish, etc. To me, the only things of a
personal or self-centered nature that one could believe
or put trust in would be one's subjective interpretations,
one's personal goals and desires, etc.}}
威加於敵，
[if] X adds power/intimidation to the enemy,
{{PEM: The question here is in what sense one "adds"
power. The clause could mean that one adds power to the
enemy, or that one applies power onto the enemy.
，<則>[故]其城可拔，其國可墜。
then X's fortifications can be taken out and X's
country can fall.
Therefore if
X does not struggle with the net of
interconnections that lies over all under heaven,
and
if X does not nurture the power balances of all under
heaven,
if X believes in X's personal opinions,
if X augments the power of X's enemy,
then X's cities can be uprooted,
and X's country can fall.
{{PEM: The fundamental question is, "Whose cities and
whose country can be destroyed?"
{{Generally, 其 qi (its, his, her, their) refers to
whatever the subject of the sentence has been.
{{PEM: To me, this sounds like the NATO policy, and the
policy of the U.S. during World War II and afterwards in
regard to the Soviet Union. The U.S. maintained an active
diplomacy with all involved nations, augmented the
economic, military, and other forms of power of allied
nations, aided Germany after WW II, maintained a
bipartisan foreign policy at least into the early Kennedy
era. The U.S. foreign policy began to fall down with the
CCP victory in China, which was attributed to the
Democrats being "soft on communism," was revived somewhat
due to the Korean war, was damaged by both Republicans and
Democrats during the Vietnam War era because neither could
grant the other any quarter in the ideological war for
control of the U.S. government. The Democrats could not
afford to be "soft on Communism," and the Republicans
could not give up their political advantage until Nixon
converted his anti-communist stand into his being the
only one who could open relations with the PRC without
being called a traitor.
{{U.S. policy fell into disarray after the fall of the
Soviet Union, and neither Republicans nor Democrats would
devote adequate resources to "strengthening the power" of
the former Soviet states. A great opportunity was lost to
the cause of lower taxes.
{{Now it is the U.S. whose "fortifications" stand in
danger of being uprooted.}}
The alternative interpretation would be:
Therefore
X should not struggle with the net of
interconnections that lies over all under heaven,
and
X should not nurture the power of any or all under
heaven,
X should believe in/strive for X's personal interests,
X should exert power heavily on X's enemy,
then the enemy's cities can be uprooted,
and the enemy's country can fall.
{{PEM: So by isolating one's own country diplomatically,
and by not giving any support to others, and by
being self-centered and self-serving, and by
exerting power on one's enemy
then the enemy's cities can be uprooted,
and the enemy's country can fall.
{{PEM: To me, this sounds like the policy that Hitler
followed during the Second World War. Hitler abandoned
prior commitments to other nations in Europe, and then
betrayed the Soviet Union. Following that, as the war
continued Hitler refused good counsel from his generals,
and attempted to overpower all enemies. The result was
that his own cities suffered immense damage and his own
country was conquered.}}
==[]==
{{Earlier stuff}}
施無法之賞，懸無政之令，犯三軍之眾，若使一人。
If one rewards others in an unprincipled way, if one
issues illegitimate orders, if one gives offense to
the masses that compose the Three Armies, it is as
though they were one's own personal servant to be
commanded,
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
犯之以事，勿告以言。犯之以利，勿告以害。
If one offends them by committing some act, do not
seek to recompense them by one's words. If one
offends them by offering some benefit to them, do not
seek to redress matters by doing injury in
compensation.
{{PEM: Generally the above passage is taken to fit in
somehow with the interpretation of the ideal general as
an arbitrary tyranical military genius. The first part
seems like practical advice. If the general has to give
his troops a bad job to do, no good will come of it if he
seems by words to minimize the dangers and hardships. The
second part is harder to understand. How could a general
give his troops something good that they would cause them
to take umbrage? Possibly it ties in with the preceding
idea. For instance, if three batallions normaly fight as a
unit and it falls to one of them to go through the pass to
safety last and guard the retreat, then that batallion may
take heavy losses while the other two batallions get off
with little or do damage. The friends and relatives of the
injured and dead in the first two batallions may feel that
they should have had an equal share in the danger so that
they could have protected those to whom they are close.
They may suffer survivor guilt. If that is what he was
thinking about then Master Sun's point would be that it
will do nobody any good to contrive a situation of
compensatory danger and hardship for members of the other
two batallions. It would be better to tell everyone that
the choice was made for the benefit of all, knowing that
somebody had to do the dirty work, and that he had chosen
the batallion that was best suited for this duty. What the
other batallions are ordered to do in the future will
depend on similar objective criteria.}}
投之亡地然後存，陷之死地然後生。
If thrown into a perishing land, then afterwards they
shall be preserved.
If trapped in a dead zone, then afterwards they shall
live.
{{PEM: If the preceding interpretation is correct, then
this passage would be a continuation of what the general
would need to make a common understanding of all his
troops: The object, when one lands in a desperate
situation is that the group survive. Cohesiveness is
not a guarantee of individual survival, but it is a way
to provide the best survival chances for the group. There
can be no personal favorites played. The only
consideration is that the loss of a finger does not
injure survival probabilities as much as does the loss
of a major organ.}}
夫眾陷於害，然後能為勝敗。
Now the multitudes emcounter pitfalls and so suffer
injuries, and yet afterwards they can carry forth with
victory or with defeat.
{{PEM: This is Master Sun's summation of the above
argument. Losses are inevitable in warfare. When troops
lose their cohesion and ability to function well or
not will depend, ultimately, on how they have been
led to understand their functioning as members of a
group with a purpose that is linked to their highest
interests, the safety of their homes and families.
故為兵之事，在於佯順敵之意，並力一向，千里殺將，是謂巧能成事。
Truly, the business of conducting warfare lies in
pretending to comply with the intentions of the enemy,
coordinating one's strength in one direction, and
killing their general from 1000 li away.
To be able to do so is said to bring matters to a
conclusion in a skillful way.
{{PEM: The word 故 gu has several meanings. Frequently it
means "therefore," and is used to introduce conclusions.
At other times it introduces a new conclusion that the
author intends to prove. The sentence above introduces
considerations pertinent to the beginning of offensive
action.}}
==[]==
是故政舉之日，夷關折符，
For that reason, on the day that matters of policy are
to be taken up,
{{PEM: Context show that warfare is to be the subject
of discussion.}}
夷關折符，
{{bar, lock, secure}} the passes and break up the
seals
{{PEM:so nobody can get out or forge false orders}}
無通其使﹔
Do not communicate intentions to their emissaries.
{{PEM: The Japanese Ambassador in Washington, D.C. on
the eve of World War II.}}
勵於廟廊之上，
Exhort them (i.e. one's own decision makers) in the halls
of the ancestors
以誅其事。
in order to execute their business.
{{誅 zhu ordinarily means "to execute" in the sense of
terminating the life of a criminal.}}
敵人開闔，必亟入之，
While the enemy carries out the daily affairs of life,
one must drive in with great urgency,
先其所愛，微與之期。
putting before the enemy that which they love so that
in some small way one gives them hope [of
getting something they want].
踐墨隨敵，以決 戰事。
Follow the inked line to pursue the enemy and thereby
make a move that decides the battle.
是故始如處女，敵人開戶，後如脫兔，敵不及拒。
So in the beginning one appears to be a virgin, and
the enemy opens his door. Afterwards one runs in like
an escaping rabbit, and the enemy has no time left in
which to fend off the consequences.
{{Lots of questions remaining in chapter 11.}}
<12>《孫子兵法》第十二篇 火攻
Master Sun's Art of War. Twelfth Chapter
Incendiary attack?
孫子曰﹕
Master Sun said:
凡火攻有五﹕
There are five kinds of incendiary attacks in all:
一曰火人，
The first is called burning people.
二曰火積，
The second is called burning accumulations.
三曰火輜，
The third is called burning supply wagons.
四曰火庫，
The fourth is called burning storehouses.
五曰火隊。
The fifth is called burning squadrons.
行火必有因，煙火必素具。
If one is going to loose fire, there must be a good reason to do so.
Smoke and fire must be in one's unencumbered and concrete
possession
發火有時，起火有日。
Setting fire must have its determined season, and starting fires
must have an assigned day.
時者，天之燥也。日者，月在萁﹑壁﹑翼﹑軫也。凡此四宿者，風起之日也。
The season is when the weather is dry. The day is when the moon
is in qí, bì, yì, or zhěn.
These four lunar lodges predict the days for a rising wind.
==[]==
凡火攻，必因五火之變而應之。
In all cases of fire attack, one must depend upon and respond to
the five kinds of transformations of fire.
火發於內，則早應之於外。
If a fire is set inside, then one must at the earliest
time respond to it from the outside.
{{PEM: Sabotage internally and external attack while they
are fighting the fire.}}
火發兵靜者，待而勿攻。
If a fire is set and their troops remain quiet, one must
wait it out and not attack.
{{PEM: In this case the enemy is not acting as one would
expect, so they are probably preparing an ambush.}}
極其火力，可從而從之，不可從而止。
When the fire reaches its highest power, if one can follow
it then one may follow it, but if it impossible to follow
it, then remain stationary.
火可發於外，無待於內，以時發之。
Fire can also be set on the outside. Do not wait it out on
the inside. When there is an opportunity, emit (them? it?
one's own troops?) in a timely way.
火發上風，無攻下風。
When fire is burning upwind, do not attack at a point
downwind [where one has the wind and the fire to one's
back].
晝風久，夜風止。
The winds of the daytime can persist for a long time,
but the winds come to a stop at night.
凡軍必知有五火之變，以數守之。
All troops must know that there are five transformations
that pertain to fire, and guard themselves according to
its regularities.
==[]==
故以火佐攻者明，以水佐攻者強。水可以絕，不可以奪。
So those who use fire to aid in attack are bright.
Those who use water to aid in attack are strong.
One can cut impounded water loose, but one cannot take
control of it afterwards.
夫戰勝攻取，而不修其功者凶，命曰「費留」。
When a war is won and when what was attacked is taken,
those who do not (dress =) make good use of their
accomplishments are inauspicious. Those people are called
"expensive to keep on the payroll."
故曰﹕明主慮之，
Therefore, the enlightened sovereign concentrates on
thinking about things,
良將修之。
and the excellent general perfects things.
{{PEM: The excellent general seeks to bring it to
perfection.}}
==[]==
非利不動，非得不用，非危不戰。
If it will not be beneficial, one does not go into action.
If one will not attain a goal, one will not use military
means. If it is not a crisis situation, one does not make
war.
主不可以怒而興師，將不可以慍而致戰。
A sovereign should not call up the troops because he has become
angry. A general should not go to the extreme of starting a war
because he feels indignation.
合於利而動，不合於利而止。
If one's plans are consistent with benefit then one goes
into action. If they prove not consistent with benefit
then one stops.
怒可以復喜，慍可以復悅，亡國不可以復存，死者不可以復生。
If one is angry at one moment, one may become happy again
later. If one is indignant at one moment one may become
delighted afterwards. But if one makes one's country
perish it cannot be brought back into existence, and those
who are dead cannot come back to life.
故明主慎之，良將警之。此安國全軍之道也。
Therefore the enlightened sovereign takes great care of
it. and the superior general is heedful of it. This is the
way to give peace to the nation and maintain the army
whole.
<13>《孫子兵法》第十三篇 用間
Master Sun's Art of War. Thirteenth Chapter
The use of intelligence operatives.
孫子曰﹕
Master Sun said:
凡興師十萬，出征千里，百姓之費，公家之奉，日費千金。
In all cases, raising an army of one hundred thousand and
setting out on a march of 1000 li, the daily outlay will
be 1000 pieces of gold coming from the expenses laid upon
the common people and the offerings of the nobles.
內外騷動，怠於道路，不得操業者，七十萬家。
Seven hundred thousand families will be put in an uproar
both Internally and externally, will be kept from gainful
employment by [events on] the roadways, will be
(something) while they are on the road, and will be unable
to pursue their normal means of livelihood.
相守數年，以爭一日之勝，而愛爵祿百金，不知敵之情者，不仁之至也，
Such a state may be maintained for several years for the
sake of attaining victory on a single day. Yet if by
stinting on the costs of providing noble rank and
emolument of one hundred pieces of gold one prevents
oneself from having adequate intelligence about the enemy,
that is the lowest level of lack of benevolence.
非人之將也，非主之佐也，非勝之主也。
Such a person is not a general of the people, not an aid
to the sovereign, and not the master of victory.
==[tyiuo]==
故明君賢將，所以動而勝人，成功出於眾者，先知也。
Truly, the means by which the eminent sovereigns and their
worthy generals make their moves and overcome others,
succeed and rise above the level of the masses, lies in
their having prior knowledge.
先知者，不可取於鬼神，不可象於事，不可驗於度；必取於人，知敵之情者也。
Those who have prior knowledge of things do not gain their
knowledge from ghosts and spirits, nor do they make
auguries from some kinds of events, nor to they inspect
them in "metrics."
The knowledge must come from human sources, by which means
one comes to know the true circumstances of one's enemy.
{{PEM: And, as Master Sun has argued forcefully above,
the knowledge that only spies can provide cannot be
obtained on the cheap.}}
==[]==
故用間有五﹕有因間，
Now there are five kinds of spies to be used:
Yin (depend-on guys) spies,
{{PEM: These are the local sources of information that the
master spies will visit to get indications about what is
going on.}}
有內間
inside spies,
{{PEM: These are spies who are "inside" the organizational
structures of other states.}}
有反間，
counterintelligence officers
{{PEM: These include both those who detect the spies of
other states operating on one's own territory, but also
any spies that they turn.}}
有死間，
dead spies
{{PEM: During the Second World War, the body of a dead
person was dropped into the Atlantic at a location where
it would be apt to be found by Nazi forces. In the
clothing of the dead man they put documents that gave
false information about where Allied troops would land on
D-Day. The cases that Master Sun has in mind, however,
probably include still living spies who are believed to
have been found out and therefore soon to be killed. Truly
cynical spy masters might deliberately arrange for
one of their spies to be captured while bearing false
information.}}
有生間。
live spies.
{{PEM: As the contrary of the preceding entry, this
category would include all spies whose identities have not
yet been found out.}}
五間俱起，莫知其道，是謂神紀，人君之寶也。
When all five classes of intelligence operatives are put
into operation and nobody knows their ways, this is called
godlike planning, and it is the treasure of the rulers of
men.
因間者，因其鄉人而用之也。
The "yin" intelligence officers depend on their local contacts for
intelligence.
內間者，因其官人而用之也。
The internal agents are the other side's (compromised)
officials on whom our case officers depend for
intelligence.
反間者，因其敵間而用之也。
Counterintelligence officers use the enemy agents they have found
out (turned).
死間者，為誑事於外，令吾聞知之，而傳於敵間也。
As for dead intelligence officers, one fakes events that can be
detected and reported to those who spy on us.
生間者，反報也。
The live intelligence officers are those who return with their
reports.
故三軍之事，莫親於間，賞莫厚於間，事莫密於間。
So among the activities of the three armies, there is nothing more
central than intelligence operations, and nothing should be given
higher rewards than gaining good intelligence. There are no
activities more secret than intelligence.
非聖智不能用間，非仁義不能使間，非微妙不能得間之
If one is not possessed of the most sagely wisdom one cannot
make good use of intelligence. If one is not benevolent and just,
one cannot make good use of intelligence [agents]. If one is not
gifted with the highest subtlety, one cannot gain the substance of
intelligence.
微哉﹗微哉﹗無所不用間也。間事未發，而先聞者，間與所
告者皆死。
How subtle! How minute! There is no work of state to which
intelligence does not contribute. And if an intelligence operation
is detected before it goes into operation, then the spies and those
to whom they were to report are all dead!
{{PEM: It is cynical to suspect that this means that one should kill
one's own spies. Besides, it does not make sense.}}
==[]==
凡軍之所欲擊，城之所欲攻，人之所欲殺，必先知其守將﹑
左右﹑謁者﹑門者﹑舍人之姓名，
In all cases where the objectives are such as: selected military
targets, cities that one plans to attack, or people that one desires to
kill, one must first know the identities of the generals that protect
them, the subordinates who support the latter, the keepers of their
gates, and the staff personnel in their bases.
令吾間必索知之。
Command the five classes of intelligence agents that they must
gain knowledge of all of these matters.
必索敵人之間來間我者，因而利之，導而舍之，故反間可得
而使也。
One must detect the intelligence officers of the opposition that are
directed to gain intelligence pertaining to us, and consequently
offer them blandishments (both obvious and also realistic
temptations), and by that means gain control of their movements
and determine where they find protection. In that way one can
gain counter-intelligence [operatives] {{PEM:turned spies}} and
make proper use of them.
因是而知之，故鄉間﹑內間可得而使也﹔
Having identified incoming intelligence operatives by the above
means, both spies on the outskirts and spies on the inside can be
apprehended and made use of.
因是而知之，故死間為誑事可使告敵﹔
Having identified incoming intelligence operatives by the above
means, even dead (or severely compromised) foreign agents can
be caused to give false indications and by such means provide
disinformation to the enemy.
因是而知之，故生間可使如期。
Having identified incoming intelligence operatives by the above
means, even living agents (unaware that they have been
compromised) can be made to perform as though by our own
scheduling.
{{PEM: This sentence may also mean that having turned an
enemy agent we can use knowledge gained to protect our live
assets and let them return with their needed information.}}
五間之事，主必知之，知之必在於反間，故反間不可不厚
也。
The five principle kinds of intelligence operations must be known
by the ruler, and knowing these five kinds of things must depend
on counterintelligence. Therefore the highest importance must be
given to counterintelligence and to turned spies.
==[Shang dynasty times]==
昔殷之興也，伊摯在夏﹔
In ancient times Yin came to prominence because of Yi Zhi at
Xia.
周之興也，呂牙在殷。
Zhou came to prominence because of Lǚ Ya at Yin.
故惟明君賢將能
So it is only the enlightened rulers and the worthy generals who
are able to
以上智為間者，
use the most wise and intelligent individuals as spies
必成大功。
and therefore will inevitably have great achievements.
此兵之要，三軍之所恃而動也。
These are the essentials of war, that which the Three Armies
depend upon to move.
end
